

an ounce of prevention

the failure of G8 policy on armed conflict



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Cover Photo Jon Warren/WorldVision
Philippe, depicted in this photo when he was 10, witnessed the slaying of his uncle and grandfather and buried his mother - all before he turned 8. Experts estimate that 80% of Rwanda's 3.75 million children suffered a severe traumatic event during the genocide and its aftermath. They bear the costs of conflict.

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an ounce of prevention

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executive summary

The English language has three proverbs that proclaim the virtues of exerting a planned effort in the short-term to save a great deal of effort and heartache in the long term: "penny-wise but pound-foolish", "a stitch in time saves nine", or "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure" are just a few of those sentiments. These sayings, however, have not yet permeated the international institutions whose policies and practices currently affect at least 19 million people displaced by wars taking place in sixteen selected countries. The international community's collective failings have cost over 14 million lives in the last four decades, and run up over US\$84 billion in debt.

The chapters in this report represent World Vision's distinct analysis on the human, social and economic costs that violent conflict has wreaked in sixteen different contexts that have not had the high media profile of Iraq. It is World Vision's attempt to highlight countries suffering from the 'perfect storm' of post-conflict recovery: low human development, high indebtedness, and another significant challenge, often disease or poor economic prospects. These conflicts have exacted concurrent and crippling consequences on the people living in them; factors which, left unaddressed, make them highly susceptible to future violent conflict. Industrialised countries, and in particular the G8, however, need not be resigned to inevitable civil wars. If pursued, the recommendations presented here offer a realistic chance not only of averting re-cycling of individual conflicts, but of addressing other global afflictions that are fuelled by the preponderance of wars.

The total debt of the countries¹ profiled in this study - US\$84.1 billion - is significantly less than Iraq's debt. None of the countries profiled have the same economic potential that Iraq possesses with its oil reserves. These countries on average have experienced longer conflicts, have much lower GDP per capita and their debt represents a larger proportion of their income potential. The principle of immediate and total debt forgiveness should at the very least be extended to these countries. Debt forgiveness for all the countries in this study would have immediate effects.

The recommendations contained in this paper include suggestions for conflict-sensitive and effective debt relief and development assistance. Recommendations included here also cover improving peacekeeping, controlling small arms and curtailing the illegal exploitation of natural resources in countries in conflict, and the inclusion of civil society in peacebuilding and peace-making.

This report attempts to catalogue the human, social and economic costs of conflict in sixteen different countries and recommend changes that will help prevent future conflicts. Perhaps the biggest challenge for the international community to address the costs of conflict is a political one. Ten years ago the research NGO Saferworld undertook a comprehensive study on the financial costs of conflict and potential savings of peace, which concluded that the principle challenge of preventing conflicts is one of political will.

¹ As a Republic of the Russian Federation, Chechnya is not recognised by the United Nations as a sovereign nation.

introduction

Imagine a disease that kills millions of people around the world and cripples economies. Unlike other global epidemics like HIV-AIDS, however, the effects of this disease extend further, to environmental destruction. Affordable and effective treatments for this disease are at the disposal of the international community but instead many governments knowingly pursue policies that foster the disease and allow it to claim more victims. The disease is armed conflict and this document outlines just some of its effects.

The chapters in this report represent World Vision's distinct analysis on the human, social and economic costs that violent conflict has wreaked in sixteen different contexts that have not had the high media profile of Iraq. It is World Vision's attempt to highlight countries suffering from the 'perfect storm' of post-conflict recovery: low human development, high indebtedness, and another significant challenge, often disease or poor economic prospects. These countries suffer from concurrent and crippling consequences of past wars; factors which, left unaddressed, make them highly susceptible to future violent conflict. Industrialised countries, and in particular the G8, however, need not be resigned to inevitable civil wars. If pursued, the recommendations presented here offer a realistic chance not only of averting re-cycling of individual conflicts, but of addressing other global afflictions that are fuelled by the preponderance of wars.

Conflict	Years of conflict	Estimated Population (End of Conflict or 2003)	Est. Civilian Casualties, % of population	Displacement, as percent of population	External Debt, US\$ billion	Child Mortality (< 5 yrs)	2003 HDI Ranking	Adult HIV/AIDS Prevalence 2002
Afghanistan	24	28,700,000	3.5%	4.5%	2.4	257	N/A	N/A
Angola	36	12,700,000	11.8%	18.1%	9.6	260	164	5.5%
Burundi	10	6,100,000	4.9%	18.0%	1.1	190	171	8.3%
Cambodia	30	11,800,000	15.7%	5.9%	2.7	138	130	2.7%
Chechnya ¹	10	800,000	14.8%	29.4%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
DR Congo	5	56,600,000	8.8%	6.4%	11.4	205	167	4.9%
Guatemala	36	11,000,000	1.8%	10.9%	5	58	119	0.4%
Haiti ²	14	7,500,000	N/A	0.5%	1.25	123	150	6.1%
Lebanon ³	25	3,200,000	5.3%	25.0%	12.5	32	83	N/A
Liberia ⁴	14	3,300,000	7.6%	18.8%	2	235	N/A	8.2%
Nepal	6	25,200,000	0.04%	0.7%	2.7	91	143	0.5%
Rwanda	1	9,300,000	8.6%	0.7%	1.3	183	158	8.9%
Sierra Leone	11	5,600,000	3.6%	6.9%	1.2	316	175	7.0%
Somalia	13	8,000,000	6.3%	11.3%	2.5	225	N/A	1.0%
Sri Lanka	19	19,300,000	0.8%	2.9%	8.5	19	99	0.1%
Sudan	35	38,100,000	5.2%	14.4%	20	107	138	2.6%
Totals	289	247,200,000	-	-	84.1	-	-	-
Average	18	-	6.6%	10.9%	5.6	165	141	4.3%

Sources: UNAIDS, UNDP, UNICEF, World Bank.

¹ As a republic of the Russian Federation, Chechnya does not have its own country data.

² Haiti casualty figures are not available

³ Lebanon's IDP figure includes refugees

⁴ Liberia's AIDS figure is an estimate prior to the conflict

Colour Coding:
 External debt - yellow = "severely indebted" (World Bank)
 Child Mortality - yellow = bottom third
 HIV/AIDS - yellow = "high prevalence" (UNAIDS)
 HDI Ranking - yellow = "low human development" (UNDP)
 Bolded figure: "worst" in that category

Fighting the global scourge of armed conflict requires profound conceptual and mechanical changes to the current conflict management approach. Today the Security Council and other similar organisations attempt the equivalent of fighting multiple brushfires with a garden hose. The majority of time is spent managing existing conflicts rather than seeking to prevent

outbreaks in the first place. Only a fundamental paradigm shift of global institutions towards prevention will relegate conflict management to the dustbin of ideas. Just as fire departments in industrialised countries today spend far less time fighting fires than promoting fire safety and testing smoke detectors, the global institutions responsible for international peace must decrease their dependence on the crude, too-little-too-late responses of peacekeeping and 'humanitarian intervention'.

"Three big global scourges - AIDS, drugs, and safe havens for terrorism, have been attributed to civil war environments."

(Collier and Hoeffler, 2)

The conceptual aspects of this change are numerous and difficult. True conflict prevention encompasses a variety of disparate technical specialties: early warning and analysis, participatory peacemaking processes and 'quiet diplomacy', conflict-sensitive relief and development, education to promote peace, control of global small arms flows, enhanced capacities for mediation, and media practices that mitigate tensions, to name a few. Promoting a culture of prevention has been the stated political aim of various international institutions, but it requires sober reflection on lessons learned, innovation to surpass those lessons and the political courage to implement what has been demonstrated to work.

The English language has three proverbs that proclaim the virtues of exerting a planned effort in the short-term to save a great deal of effort and heartache in the long term: "penny-wise but pound-foolish", "a stitch in time saves nine", or "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure" are just a few of those sentiments. These sayings, however, have not yet permeated the international institutions whose policies and practices currently affect at least 19 million people displaced by wars taking place in sixteen selected countries. The international community's collective failings have cost over 14 million lives in the last four decades, and run up over US\$84 billion in debt.

penny-wise but pound-foolish

None of the G8 members meet the OECD's modest investment target for development assistance of 0.7% of Gross National Product. Qualitative measures, such as the Commitment to Development Index (CDI)², also conclude there is much room for improvement. Industrialised countries can barely expect to make a dent on current conflicts with current low levels and poor quality of aid. Instead, the international media and elected politicians feed on the spectacle of "crisis management" while the principal responsibility to carry out expensive and often ineffective measures to quell conflicts is delegated to an over-loaded and often divided UN Security Council. The lack of strategic and long-term investment in sustainable development - 'structural prevention' to use language of the UN Secretary-General - breeds inequality and tightens the descending spiral of greed and grievance, exacerbating latent tensions into explosively violent conflicts. Likewise, inadequate international measures to stop the illegal exploitation of natural resources or the inundation of small arms and light weapons to conflict zones inflict a heavy-toll in post-conflict societies in the form of the breakdown of the rule of law and increased organised criminal activity. Without substantial assistance from the international community, countries recovering from conflict attempt to find their footing on the shores of economic viability whilst trying to swim with a millstone around their neck.

² The Commitment to Development Index is an annual ranking of OECD donors created by the Center for Global Development and the journal Foreign Affairs. The Index tracks indicators on the relations between rich and poor countries in seven distinct areas: aid, trade, security, migration, technology, environment and investment.

Debt forgiveness should be a top-of-mind option for investment in post-conflict countries. The US Administrator in Iraq, Paul Bremer has testified to US Congress that: " Iraq is in no position to service its existing debt, let alone to take on more. " Iraq has massive debts, which the International Institute for Finance estimates at \$134bn, or 400% of gross domestic product. Reconstruction costs are estimated to total at least \$75 billion³.

The total debt of the countries profiled in this study - US\$84 billion - is significantly less than Iraq's debt. None of the countries profiled have the same economic potential that Iraq possesses with its oil reserves. These countries on average have experienced longer conflicts, have much lower GDP per capita and their debt represents a larger proportion of their income potential. The principle of immediate and total debt forgiveness elaborated both by Paul Bremer and James Baker should at the very least be extended to these countries and those classified by the World Bank as Low Income

Countries Under Stress (LICUS). The World Bank's \$25 million Trust Fund "to strengthen institutions, support early efforts at policy reform and build capacity for social service delivery" in Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) is a welcome development but barely constitutes a drop in the bucket. At \$20 billion, Sudan's external debt is the largest in this study and far beyond its capacity to repay. Debt forgiveness for all the countries in this study would be less than Iraq's, have immediate effects, and together would total approximately twice the ODA commitment of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members in 2003. Without debt relief, however, these countries will remain shackled to the constraints of post-conflict economic stagnation without the means to rise to viability.

Several governments attempted to include their global efforts to combat terror in their ODA figures at the April 2004 OECD meetings. This impulse is both wrong-headed and disingenuous. It is wrong-headed because even broad-ranging initiatives as the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change separate terrorism from development questions, while studiously avoiding use of 'soft' and 'hard' security distinctions. It is disingenuous because all G8 members fall well short of the 0.7% of GNP target for ODA.

a stitch in time saves nine

In the conflict cycle, international assistance will have greatest effect when timed well with the recovery cycle. Three of the conflicts studied here - Guatemala, Sudan and Angola - lasted over 35 years. The influx of development assistance or 'peace dividend' that quickly follows ceasefire agreements often comes at the time when national capacity is least able to absorb large flows of overseas development assistance. In the aftermath of violent conflicts, civil society is nascent, government is overwhelmed and thugs continue to act with impunity in the resultant power vacuum. According to Breaking the Conflict Trap, international assistance in the form of debt relief, sustainable development, micro-enterprise, security sector reform, human rights education, arms monitoring, and democratic development are most effective in the middle of the post-conflict decade, often precisely when donor interest has reached a low or decayed into tangled and uncoordinated duplication.

"Presidential envoy James A. Baker III, a former U.S. secretary of state, ...is pushing for as much as 90 percent of the debt to be forgiven or rescheduled. Estimates of Iraq's total indebtedness range as high as \$130 billion. ...administration officials have said debt relief is essential for Iraq's economic development. Debt reduction is critical if the Iraqi people are to have a chance to build a free and prosperous Iraq.

Council on Foreign Relations

³ Iraq Reconstruction Costs - <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3158348.stm>

Likewise, improved rapid response capacity is essential to prevent incipient conflicts from escalating into massive violence. Although the most effective measures to mitigate the costs of conflict are long-term 'structural prevention', there is a role for enhanced and rapid-response peacekeeping. According to Collier and Hoeffler's Copenhagen report, peacekeeping - though politically problematic - has one of the highest rates of return on investment. Liberia is one of three countries in this study suffering from a "perfect storm" of conflict costs: severe indebtedness, high HIV prevalence, low human development, and high child mortality. Liberia has benefited from a robust international response to the most recent phase of its civil war, but vigilance will be required particularly in terms of security to weather the post-"CNN-effect" period when international attention wanes. Liberia's post-conflict recovery depends on well-trained peacekeepers creating humanitarian space and a climate of reconstruction. The UN Security Council can do more to work with regional organisations such as ECOWAS or the African Union on 'standby arrangements', insist on dedicated training of standby troops for troop contributing countries especially in human rights, HIV-AIDS awareness and gender issues.

Another critical factor during the conflict phase is the control of arms flows. While peacekeeping troops sometimes have a mandate to patrol or enforce sanctions regimes, the record of the Security Council is one of not enough intervention, not too much. Several leading international NGOs (IANSA, Amnesty, Oxfam) have championed sensible measures to address the highly unregulated global arms flows⁴. Yet arms embargoes are poorly monitored; MONUC troops in the Congo have an area the size of Europe to patrol and a very vague mandate. Linked with the explosion of arms is the illegal exploitation of resources. Despite the fact that the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo has been the world's deadliest - an estimated 5,000,000 casualties in five years - the Security Council opted in 2003 to dissolve the expert's panel of on the illegal exploitation of resources in the DRC, on the grounds that the panel itself cost too much to administer. While there is probably room to trim extra costs, such a short-term perspective ignores the tremendous damage done in a short period where there is less international observation of the parties' commitments to the Pretoria agreements. (Furthermore, the governments who complained most vociferously about the costs of the panel were the two largest contributors to reconstruction in Iraq, expenditure that is thousands of times greater with fewer costs in human lives). Effective measures to halt weapons and resources flows to conflict zones can have a profound effect on reducing the costs of conflict.

an ounce of prevention

Re-aligning international institutions toward prevention requires a small conceptual shift with massive implications. International non-governmental organisations adopt this conceptual shift when they adopt conflict-sensitive development principles and conduct conflict analysis on the impact of their humanitarian assistance. However, failure to properly analyse the impact of humanitarian assistance in conflict contexts can have four possible effects: "feed militants; sustain and protect the militants' supporters; contribute to the war economy; and provide legitimacy to combatants" (Lischer, 82). NGOs such as the Collaborative for Development Action, Saferworld and International Alert have provided frameworks to assist international NGOs in designing or re-designing humanitarian assistance or development to mitigate against exacerbating tensions. Donor governments, however, have no such guidelines or frameworks, and often work against

"The benefits of a reduction in the global incidence of civil war are common to all successful deployments of instruments for conflict reduction." (Collier and Hoeffler, 2)

⁴ <http://www.controlarms.org/>

each other in pursuing narrowly-defined "quick impact projects".

A nascent transnational network, the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict⁵ has proposed a comprehensive policy agenda to mainstream conflict prevention practices throughout civil society, multilateral organisations and governments. The Partnership's main goal is to mobilise the political will to achieve four main objections: a) a transnational network that will promote enhanced, sustainable, practical and streamlined collaboration between international conflict prevention actors (Governments, Regional Organisations, UN Agencies, and CSOs); b) Concrete commitments from governments, regional organisations, and UN entities to re-align existing conflict management mechanisms toward prevention; and c) comprehensive documentation of lessons learned, best practices and opportunities for improvement for civil society organisations, multilateral organisations and governments working to prevent violent conflict.

This report attempts to catalogue the human, social and economic costs of conflict in sixteen different countries and recommend changes that will help prevent future conflicts. Perhaps the biggest challenge for the international community to address the costs of conflict is a political one. Ten years ago the research NGO Saferworld undertook a comprehensive study on the financial costs of conflict and potential savings of peace, which concluded: "Above all, the international community needs the political will to ...improve the world's ability to manage conflict." (Cranna, 202). This challenge remains equally valid today.

recommendations

Recommendation #1 - G8 should prioritise immediate debt relief for all Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS). The definition of stress should include the indicators from Table 1: any country experiencing 'three strikes' (i.e. high HIV-AIDS prevalence, low HDI ranking and severe indebtedness, for example) should qualify for highest levels of debt relief. World Vision has consistently called for poverty reduction strategies⁶ that include local ownership and participation and which build local accountability into debt relief.

Recommendation #2 - Contributions by G8 members toward combating terrorism should not be counted toward development assistance. 0.7% of Gross National Product toward Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) remains a realistic and achievable target; if wealthy countries met their ODA obligations completely, however, that assistance would still only represent a fraction of annual global military spending.

Recommendation #3 - G8 Governments should agree on common frameworks for conflict-sensitive assistance. To avoid duplication and excessive 'front-loading' of post-conflict assistance, the G8 should take advantage of initiatives like the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative to undertake systematic review of assistance to countries under stress and implement coordinated and conflict-sensitive development assistance.

Recommendation #4: G8 governments should time their post-conflict

⁵ <http://www.conflictprevention-dialogue.org>

⁶ Whaites, Alan *PRSPs: Good News for the Poor? Social Conditionality, Participation and Poverty Reduction* Los Angeles: World Vision, 2000. p.11.

assistance to peak at the same time that national and civil society to absorb that assistance peaks. Too often development assistance is heaped on newly-formed post-conflict governments in the first few years, when in fact it is best for that assistance to arrive in sustainable and transparent tranches several years later, long after the "CNN-effect" has evaporated.

Recommendation #5: Peacebuilding troops under UN command should be trained in advance on typical humanitarian protection tasks. Many peacekeeping operations fail to uphold humanitarian protection tasks because troop-contributing countries are not willing or able to provide dedicated peacekeeping training for their troops. G8 members can support capacity-building for peacekeepers, especially through regional organisations, in order to ensure that they meet international standards in respect to human rights, gender sensitivity and child protection.

Recommendation #6: G8 members should act decisively to restrict the flow of small arms to and illegal exploitation of natural resources in countries afflicted by conflict. The UN Security Council in particular should impose appropriately enforced mechanisms that restrict the flow of guns and ammunition to conflict zones and which prohibit the illegal exploitation of natural resources.

Recommendation #7: G8 members should engage the proposals developed by the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict and engage in the Civil Society Prevention Conference scheduled at UN Headquarters in July 2005. G8 members should work to enhance their cooperation with civil society in the prevention of armed conflict by creating transparent mechanisms for the exchange of early warning information, enhancing public participation in peace-making, and other appropriate modes of interaction.

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afghanistan

Background

Afghanistan has been in turmoil for 24 years. Conflict generally dates from December 1979 with the assassination of Hafizullah Amin and invasion by the former Soviet Union (FSU). Resistance and rebellion by Afghan factions (mujihadeen) swiftly followed, supported by weaponry from the U.S. Sponsored by the FSU, Sayid Mohamed Najibullah assumed the presidency in 1986.

Through UN-sponsored negotiations in 1988, FSU began a troop pull out that was completed in February 1989. More isolated than ever, Najibullah's regime fell in May 1992. The new government under President Burhamuddin Rabbani was an unstable alliance of competing warlords. Control of the central government did not extend very far beyond Kabul.⁷ Continued conflict and unsettled conditions set the stage for an incursion by "students of Islam" (Taliban) who had been "studying" in Pakistan, although most were Afghans.

The Taliban under the leadership of Mola Mohammed Omar entered Afghanistan in 1994 and took control of most of the country by September 1995. The artillery bombardment of Kabul in October 1995 killed scores of civilians. Despite set backs early in 1996, the Taliban captured Kabul in September, but fighting continued in the outlying northern provinces. Mazar-i-Sharif changed hands again and again before being occupied by the Taliban in August 1998. The city was the scene of multiple massacres; the last occurring in 2002 with the fall of the Taliban.

By August 1998, the Taliban's interpretation of Shari'a law was felt over most of the country. Taliban's Islamic government created a congenial environment for the al-Qaida international terrorist group, which moved its key leaders and training camps to Afghanistan. The price was the bombing of some of these bases by U.S. cruise missiles. Non-deterred, the Taliban captured Bamian in September 2003, putting 90% of the country under their control.⁸ The Rabbani government and its military wing, the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA), commonly known as the Northern Alliance, was confined to the north-eastern Panjsir Valley.

There the UIFSA remained isolated, but a "thorn in the flesh" of the Taliban. UIFSA remained a threat due to military and economic aid received by a bevy of countries including India, Iran, China and several FSU nations⁹ that feared the presence of an Islamic fundamentalist state on or near their borders. The U.S. initiated financial and economic actions against the Taliban government in July 1999, and the UN followed in November 1999 with an embargo on Taliban-controlled assets. Neither the U.S. nor the UN actions had much effect, and the Taliban continued to receive support from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The Taliban could not dislodge the UIFSA remnant from the Panjsir Valley, nor was the UIFSA successful in attempts to expand areas under its control.

The stalemate was broken on 7 October 2001 when the U.S. began a massive aerial assault on

⁷ Even Kabul wasn't secure. The fanatical Islamist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was part of Rabbani's government. Yet, because of a power sharing disagreement, his forces shelled Kabul in July 1992, forcing thousands of civilians to flee the city.

⁸ One of Afghanistan's greatest cultural losses was the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas, the world's tallest, by the Taliban.

⁹ Especially Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

Afghanistan in response to the Taliban's refusal to hand over Osama bin Laden and his key associates as prime suspects for planning the Trade Towers attacks on 11 September 2001. With the help of U.S. air and ground support, UIFSA troops took Kabul on 27 November. In December 2001 Hamid Karzai assumed the position as Chairman of the Interim Authority. The Loya Jirga (grand council) that met in June 2002 elected Karzai president of the interim government. Among other tasks, President Karzai is charged with calling a Loya Jirga in December 2003 to approve the new constitution for Afghanistan and to prepare for national elections in 2004.¹⁰

Costs

Death and displacement

The Afghan wars were paid for by thousands of lives, both civilians and combatants.

- An estimated 1 million deaths were directly attributed to conflict from December 1979 to October 2001. During this period another 2 million people were injured and 4 million children orphaned.
- About 3,000 Taliban troops were executed after UIFSA forces re-took Mazar-i-Sharif in May 1997. When they re-captured Mazar-i-Sharif in August 1998, Taliban fighters killed between 2,000 and 6,000 Hazara civilians. It is believed that hundreds of Taliban combatants may have been killed in 2002 while being transported in sealed containers.
- "Precision" U.S. bombing attempted to minimise "collateral damage" (killing and injuring non-combatants). Yet, bombs and terrestrial fighting between 7 October and 7 December 2001 killed somewhere between 3,800 and 5,000 civilians.¹¹
- From August through November 2003, about 100 people (combatants and civilians) per week died due to the on-going conflict.
- Landmines are a curse on the land. Afghanistan has an estimated 12 million landmines set by all parties of during the 24 years of conflict. Since 1979, an estimated 400,000 people were killed or injured by landmine explosions. The Taliban encouraged mine clearance, but operations stopped between September 2001 and February 2002. Removal of landmines was halted once again in the east due to attacks by the Taliban who accuse NGO clearance teams of being U.S. spies.
- Compounding the huge problem of landmines are cluster bombs. Each bomb contains about 100 bomblets, many of which did not explode when dropped. In effect, the bomblets become de facto landmines. Their bright colours attracted children, and in the early days of the U.S. bombing, were mistaken for food packets of the same colour.

Those who were not killed often had to flee either because of the fighting or hunger that followed. Today's returnees face numerous barriers that prevent most from returning to their home villages.

- The period from the late 1970s to early 1980s was a time of massive starvation.
- The Taliban prevented the WFP (World Food Programme) from delivering food aid to 120,000 people in Hazarajat during the 1998-1999 winter.

¹⁰ A draft of the proposed constitution of the "Islamic Republic of Afghanistan" was released in early November 2003. Islam is the state religion, although freedom to participate in other faiths is guaranteed.

¹¹ In the first 3 weeks, 1,600 air strike sorties dropped 6,000 bombs.

- The UN called Afghanistan the “hungriest” nation in 2001 because of war, insecurity and drought that began in 1998 (and not broken until 2003).
- In the late 1980s, 3.15 million people sought refuge in Pakistan; 2.35 million did so in Iran. This meant that about 1/3rd of Afghans were refugees.
- “Tens of thousands” of people were displaced during the Taliban offensive in August 1999.
- In December 2002, there were about 1.2 million IDPs (internally displaced people) in Afghanistan and 4 million Afghan refugees in other countries (1.8 - 2 million in Pakistan and 1.5 million in Iran).
- A large movement of people back to Afghanistan began in the spring of 2002. In that year about 2 million returned. In 2003, 1.5 million more people are expected to return. The number of displaced is estimated at 800,000.
- Returnees and IDPs face great challenges. About half the homes in Afghanistan were destroyed by the wars, as were 80% of the irrigation systems. There is almost no infrastructure (such as wells, schools and clinics) outside cities. Over half the roads are in disrepair due to military activity; jobs are scarce; farm fields are often mined; large percentage of livestock killed, and security is largely absent. As a result, most returnees have flocked to cities. Unfortunately, most are under or unemployed.

Years of conflict must take part of the blame for Afghanistan’s tremendous health and education deficits. Data are from the UN but should be regarded as tentative and approximate.

- Hunger is endemic. Half the children are chronically malnourished. The moderate-severe stunting, wasting and underweight rates for children less than 5 are 52%, 25% and 48%, respectively.
- Only 13% of Afghans have access to safe water, 12% to adequate sanitation.
- The child mortality rate of 257 is one of the world’s highest, as is the maternal mortality rate of 1,700. Life expectancy of 46 years is among the earth’s lowest. Accurate data to calculate the Human Development Index (HDI) is not available. In recent years, Afghanistan’s HDI was among the world’s lowest (worse).
- In June 2003 the UN issued a warning that Afghanistan’s very low HIV adult prevalence rate could rapidly increase due to the high levels of intravenous drug use among returnees.
- The adult literacy rate for men is 51%, for women it’s 21%. This sex imbalance in literacy was reflected in the percent of children attending primary school during the Taliban years: boys, 36% and girls, 11%. Current rates are not available, but anecdotal reports indicate nearly equal numbers of boys and girls attending primary school in Kabul and some other areas.

Debt

The World Bank (WB) estimated that Afghanistan’s external debt in 2003 was US 2.4 billion. Most was bilateral (US \$ 2.3); most of that was owed to Russia.¹² Afghanistan is considered to be a “severely-indebted low-income” country by the WB.

¹² http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/aag/afg_aag.pdf Russia claims that Afghanistan owes US \$9.8 billion but is willing to forgive US \$7.8 billion.

angola

Background

The cease-fire in April 2002 ended one of the world's longest and most deadly conflicts. During most years from 1966 to the ceasefire in 2002, Angola was at war. From 1966 to 1975 national militia groups fought for independence from Portugal. During most of the next 27 years, liberation armies fought each other, particularly the MPLA (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and UNITA (National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola). Until 1990, Angola also served as a proxy battlefield between the former USSR and the U.S. and their respective allies.

Hostilities between 1975 and 2002 eased three times during which a quasi-peace prevailed. The first cessation of fighting lasted about three months in 1989. The second held for 16 months, from May 1991 to the elections in September 1992. Peace was broken by Jonas Savimbi, head of UNITA, when it became clear that he would lose in a run-off election with President Eduardo dos Santos (MPLA). November 1994 until January 1998 was a period of ceasefire broken by intermittent fighting (Lusaka peace accord). Talks between Savimbi and dos Santos ultimately failed and war resumed. This time it soon became clear that government forces were stronger than UNITA's. The latter's resources of declining funds from "conflict diamonds" were dwarfed by the oil revenues that flowed to government coffers. Anticipated prolonged guerrilla warfare was averted by the death of Savimbi in February 2002 and the cease-fire that followed in April 2002.

The current peace is expected to last with the re-integration of 100,000 former UNITA soldiers into civilian life. Widespread banditry may be expected, though, as much of Angola's economy and supportive infrastructure remain in tatters. Much is made of Angola's 18% GDP (gross domestic product) increase in 2002. Yet, over 1/2 was due to increased oil and gas production, economic activities that benefit relatively few people.

Meanwhile, the long-standing rebellion of Cabinda continues. Halting this 27-year-old conflict is possible. With the surrender of UNITA, the government is now able to bring more troops and military hardware into the enclave. At the same time, the strength of the Front de Libération de l'Enclave du Cabinda (FLEC) is reported to be weakening. While the Republic of Cabinda won't emerge as a nation state, some form of local autonomy is possible.

A potential ally for peace in Cabinda, as it was for Angola, is the Church. Church leaders from all Christian persuasions joined to form the Inter-Ecclesial Committee for Peace in Angola (COIEPA). COIEPA arduously worked for peace and reconciliation in Angola while advocating on the international scene for governments and civil society to pressure the MPLA and UNITA to end the civil war.

Cost

Angola paid a tremendous price for the country's long years of conflict.

Death, injury and displacement

- About 1.5 million died, mostly civilians, due to 27 years of civil war.
- The nation is riddled with between 6 million to 20 million landmines, a lethal contribution from 22 countries. Between 4,000 and 6,000 people are injured annually, and somewhere between 70,000 to 100,000 Angolans have amputated limbs due to

landmine explosions.

- About 4.1 million people – 1/3rd of the entire population – were internally displaced. By August 2003, over 1/2 returned to their home areas. Many people were coerced by government authorities and the military to return to their home communities, usually without adequate supplies of food or other means of support.¹³
- Between 440,000 and 470,000 people were forced to flee the country because of conflict. Major receiving states were Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. About 175,000 returned between April 2002 and November 2003.

Hunger

- Although food production has increased, the World Food Programme (WFP) says 1.4 million people still require food aid (mostly internally displaced people and returnees); the government puts the figure at 2.7 million.
- The FAO (Food and Agricultural Organisation) and NGOs (non-governmental organisations) will supply 600,000 families of about 2 million people with seeds and hand tools.

Well-being and children

- The Human Development Index (HDI) in 2000 was .403, 13th from the bottom (lowest). As this index is based on literacy and longevity as well as income, the low score may be partly blamed on war.
- Children probably suffered the most.
 - In April 2003, 100,000 were still separated from their parents.
 - 45% of children less than 15 are chronically malnourished.
 - 26% die before age 5, the world's 3rd highest child mortality rate. Measles is the leading killer of children today.
 - 45% are not enrolled in school.
 - Thousands of children were used by both the government and UNITA as combatants. At war's end, there were still 8,500-11,000 child soldiers under age 15.
- Observers blame much of the 8.6% and climbing HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate directly or indirectly on the war.
- UNITA's human rights record was atrocious. Yet an immunity agreement will exempt most perpetrators of crimes against humanity.

Infrastructure and income

- Much of Angola's infrastructure was destroyed or damaged during the long years of conflict.
 - About 5,000 schools and 60% of hospitals were demolished.

¹³ ____, "Struggling through Peace: Return and Resettlement in Angola," Human Rights Watch, Aug 2003, Vol. 15, No. 16(A), pp. 8-11

- Road conditions are uniformly treacherous, made worse by the destruction of bridges. Millions will be required to rebuild even the main roads. For example, the 88-kilometre road between Lubango and Matala in the south will cost US \$14.5 million to repair.
- Electric, water and sanitation systems all require major restoration. The electric network alone will require US \$500 million to restore.
- In 2002, the government invested 20% of the national budget or 11% of the country's GDP in defence expenses.
- Between 1975 and 2000, the average annual per capita GDP declined 1.9%.
- Despite the country's woeful shape, Angola has valuable assets that could provide needed revenue for health, education and infrastructure rehabilitation. Unfortunately, the country suffers from massive and chronic corruption. In 2002, the government could not account for US \$ 1 billion in oil revenues.

Debt

Angola's total external debt at the close of 2001 was US 9.6 billion. Public and publicly guaranteed debt was US \$ 7.4 billion. Angola is listed by the World Bank as a "severely-indebted low-income" country.

Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs

burundi

Background

A decade of deaths and general mayhem date from October 1993. Burundi's second civil war¹⁴ began with a coup d'état and assassinations of the country's first elected president, Melchior Ndadaye, and six cabinet ministers. Between 100,000 and 150,000 people, both Hutu and Tutsi, died in the massacres that followed.

Parliament appointed a Hutu replacement for Ndadaye, Cyprien Ntaryamira, in 1994. Ntaryamira's term in office was brief. He died in the airplane crash that also killed the president of Rwanda in April 1994. Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, also a Hutu, took over as president, only to be deposed in a second coup led by Major Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi, in July 1996. Under international pressure that included economic sanctions, in June 1998 Buyoya and the Hutu-dominated parliament agree to a transitional constitution with Buyoya as president.

By 2000 the government and most Tutsi groups ("G-10") signed a ceasefire as did some of the Hutu parties ("G-7"), but not the two main Hutu warring factions. Through the persistence of other African states, talks with the FDD (Forces for the Defence of Democracy),¹⁵ the larger of the guerrilla forces, begin in January 2001. This peace effort was anathema to radical Tutsi factions, which staged attempted coups in April and July 2001.¹⁶

Meanwhile, talks leading to a three-year transitional government culminated in November 2001

¹⁴ The first civil war took place between April 1972 and November 1976 when 120,000 people were killed.

¹⁵ Also known as CNDD- (National Council for the Defence of Democracy) FDD, in recognition that the rebels are a political party. The FDD split in 2001, and the smaller faction did not take part in the ceasefire agreement.

¹⁶ Former head of state Jean-Baptiste Bagaza of the hard-line Tutsi PARENA (Party for National Renewal) was implicated in the July coup.

with Buyoya of the Tutsi-dominated UPRONA (National Unity and Progress Party) assuming the presidency for the first 18 months. Domitien Ndayizeye, member of the mostly Hutu FRODEBU (Front for the democracy of Burundi) party became vice-president. The men were to switch roles on 30 April 2003. Serious doubts existed if the more hard line Tutsi parties, backed by the Tutsi-manned and controlled army, would permit the swap. To most everyone's relief, Ndayizeye's installation as president wasn't followed by a coup. Ndayizeye's reign is not assured, though, as the government remains fragile and fractured.

Although the new president hasn't been expelled by the army (he carefully cultivated the armed forces while vice-president), Ndayizeye's presidency wasn't welcomed by the FNL (National Liberation Forces),¹⁷ the more belligerent of the Hutu warring factions. From May through July 2003 the FNL attacked both the army and FDD forces near Bujumbura. At the same time, FNL rebels indiscriminately shelled sections of the city causing over 300 civilian and combatant deaths while forcing about 40,000 people to leave their homes.

What will stop are repeated violations of the government/FDD ceasefire. Both parties are guilty of not honouring the ceasefire agreement. Good news came on 7 October 2003 when President Ndayizeye and FDD leader Pierre Nkurunziza signed the Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing in Burundi.¹⁸ The accord states that the army (Burundi National Defence Force) and Burundi Police Force will evolve into units of equal numbers of Tutsis and Hutus. The FDD will also get four ministerial and second vice-president posts in the Transitional Government. Credit for the peace accord is largely due to the doggedness of African leaders, especially present and past presidents of Tanzania and South Africa. Largely behind the scene, though, were the efforts of many church groups to help create conditions where ethnic and factional dialogue could take place. The FNL, the remaining major rebel group, continues in its adamant refusal to negotiate with the Transitional Government.

If everything works as planned, Burundi should be at peace, except for a declining number of skirmishes as the FNL weakens. But Burundi being Burundi, this may be an overly optimistic scenario. The country is not only divided by ethnic distrust and hatred, but there are fractures between and among most of the Tutsi and Hutu-led parties. Splits are frequent, as are coalitions that form and break apart. The key factor remains the army. If the armed forces don't lead or take part in a coup, then Burundi has a chance of achieving a fair measure of political stability and a representative government after elections in 2004.

Cost

Citizens of Burundi paid an extraordinarily high price for the decade of civil war.

Deaths

- Somewhere around 300,000 people, mostly non-combatants, were killed.

Orphaned

- About 25,000 children were orphaned by war.

¹⁷ Sometimes prefaced by Palipuhutu (Party for the Liberation of Hutu People), the political wing of the FNL. The FNL split in 2002 with the weaker wing joining the Transitional Government. The main body of FNL is led by Agathon Rwaza.

¹⁸ The treaty was finalised on 17 November 2003. A week earlier, the Tutsi-dominated hard line Parena Party stated a desire to negotiate with the Transitional Government.

Displaced

- Estimates of refugees range from 450,000 to 650,000. There are over 350,000 refugees in camps overseen by the UN in Tanzania and about 20,000 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In addition, probably another 300,000 Burundians reside in Tanzania outside refugee camps (“spontaneously settled”).
- Internally displaced people (IDPs) are difficult to approximate as conflict continues. Estimates range from 300,000 to 450,000, a high number but down from 1.1 million in 1999.
- This means that the total number of displaced people in November 2003 numbered between 750,000 and 1.1 million. That is, between 12.3% and 18% of the population. About 60,000 people were displaced due to FNL/government fighting between September and November 2003.

Morbidity, mortality and health care are related in part to conflict

- Life expectancy declined from 51 years in 1993 to 40 years in 2002.
- In the last decade, the maternal mortality rate tripled.
- Only 10% of infants are immunised against measles.
- 45% of children less than 5 are moderately to severely underweight, and the moderate to severe wasting rate for children is 57%.
- The child mortality rate of 190 is the world’s 14th highest.
- With an average of one (1) physician per 100,000 people between 1992 and 2000, Burundi’s physician/patient ratio was the lowest in the world.
- 27% of the population has access to safe water. Before the war it was 50%.
- The HIV adult prevalence rate was 10% in 2003 but rising fast in rural areas (now 7.5%) where most people live. Fortunately, the 20.5% HIV rate in urban areas is beginning to fall.
- Burundi’s Human Development Index (HDI) is .337, ranking the country 171 of 175.

Other costs

- Economy. GNP (gross national product) per capita declined 5.9% per year in real terms between 1990 and 1997. Burundi faced an acute economic decline since 1993, and has repeatedly defaulted on its external loans.
- Food aid. Largely due to the war, in September 2003 there were 210,000 vulnerable households in Burundi or 14.7% of the population. The WFP (World Food Programme) is supplying 155,500 households with a food ration.
- Literacy and education. The adult literacy rate is 48% (World Vision Burundi puts it at 30%). This will likely fall in the short term as only 47% of school-age children are receiving a primary education.

Debt

Burundi’s total external debt at the end of 2001 was US \$1.1 billion. Public and publicly guaranteed debt was US \$1 billion. The World Bank considers the Burundi to be a “severely-indebted low-income” nation.

Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs

cambodia

Background

“Severely traumatised, extremely poor but on the road to recovery,” are three characteristics of Cambodia. The trauma dates from the Japanese occupation during World War II, continued through Hun Sen’s coup d’état in 1997, and persists today. The country’s darkest days were the mid-1960s to the late 1970s when the Cambodian people encountered a double dose of conflict. External forces used the country as a battlefield. North Vietnam set up bases in Cambodia to transport weapons and pursue war against the South Vietnamese government and its U.S. ally. The U.S. response was to bomb suspected and potential North Vietnamese bases and transport infrastructure in Cambodia, causing much “collateral” (human) and environmental damage. Internally, the royalist government of King Sihanouk was deposed by a coup d’état led by General Lon Nol in 1970. The Maoist Khmer Rouge and Sihanouk guerrillas, supported by North Vietnam and China, battled the U.S.-supported Lon Nol government, defeating it in 1975.

Cambodia became the Democratic Kampuchea under the Khmer Rouge led by the xenophobic dictator, Pol Pot. Urban populations were either forced into rice fields to humble and re-educate people as farmer-peasants or, if from middle and upper classes, into special centres where most were tortured and executed. Between executions, starvation and disease, 1.7 to 2 million people died in less than 4 years, about 1/5th of the population.

Victory within Cambodia was not matched by peace outside. Border conflicts in 1979 with the Khmer Rouge’s former patron Vietnam rapidly escalated. In retaliation and defence, Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978; Phnom Penh fell in January 1979, forcing the Khmer Rouge into the north-west part of the country and adjacent refugee camps in Thailand. The Khmer Rouge engaged in guerrilla warfare against the Vietnam army and Cambodian puppet government, displacing thousands of civilians. Hun Sen, supported by the Vietnamese, instituted the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Republic and became prime minister in 1985. Yet conflict with the Khmer Rouge continued. Vietnam withdrew its troops in 1989, due to international pressure¹⁹ and the cost of keeping forces in Cambodia to shore up the Hun Sen government.

Seeing his military and economic support disappear, Hun Sen sought international recognition and foreign investment by abandoning communism and re-constituting Buddhism as the state religion. In October 1991, with the intervention of the UN Transitional Authority (UNTAC), Cambodia’s political factions agreed to a cease-fire and transitional government with King Sihanouk as head of state. The new constitution re-established the monarchy but without constitutional power. Elections in 1993 set the stage for a three-party coalition government with of the royalist Funcinpec’s (United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Co-operative Cambodia) Prince Norodom Ranariddh as prime minister and Hun Sen of the CPP (Cambodian People’s Party) as deputy prime minister.

The Khmer Rouge as a political and military force continued to weaken as deputy leader Ieng Sary and thousands of guerrillas surrendered during government amnesties. The Khmer Rouge turned on Pol Pot in 1997, and condemned him to life imprisonment. The sentence lasted a year, ending with Pol Pot’s death in 1998. The vestiges of further obstruction by the Khmer Rouge ceased, and the last violent resistance from the Khmer Rouge ended in 1999.

¹⁹ The People’s Republic of Kampuchea was recognised by few countries outside the communist block.

With tensions rising between the coalition partners following the 1993 elections, Hun Sen used the CCP controlled military in 1997 to remove Prince Ranariddh from power. Faced with international condemnation, Hun Sen proceeded with elections in July 1998 and allowed international observers. The consensus of international observers were that the elections were “credible” but not “free and fair” by international standards due to the bullying tactics of the ruling CPP. The CPP garnered most of seats in the 123-member National Assembly but not the 2/3rds majority needed to govern. Eventually through the intervention of the King, a coalition CPP-Funcinpec government was formed with Hun Sen as prime minister and Prince Ranariddh as leader of the National Assembly. Despite murmurs about strong-arm tactics within the political arena, international donors pledged aid in the form of loans and grants; foreign development investment rose, and Cambodia began to experience substantial economic growth.

Progress in economics is not matched by improvements in political expression. During local elections in 2002, 15 non-CPP candidates were killed. The CPP and opposition parties were accused of using general intimidation tactics and vote buying. Not surprising, CPP won the majority of commune council seats. The July 2003 national elections were an improvement over those of 1998. Polling was mostly considered free and fair but pre-election violence, access to the media and abuses of incumbent powers resulted in a less than free and fair election process. CPP won a majority of Assembly seats, but has yet to form a new government by forming a coalition with a 2/3rds majority in the parliament to appoint a new prime minister.

Cost

Not all socio-economic and political damage to Cambodia is attributed to conflict, but much of it surely may be. A nation cannot experience the excruciating trauma that Cambodia has undergone without leaving scars that will last for generations.

Death and displacement

The Khmer Rouge murdered or starved to death 1.7 to 2 million people in a demonic form of ethnic suicide. In the decade of 1975-1985, there were over 700,000 Cambodians in refugee camps in Thailand. None are there today. About half immigrated to other countries, mostly in the West. The other half returned to Cambodia after 1993.

Landmines

Mention “Cambodia” and the image of people crippled by landmines comes readily to mind. Since 1975, about 40,000 people lost one or more limbs, amputated by landmine explosions. At one time, 3,000 people each year were killed or wounded by landmines and UXO (such as unexploded bombs and artillery shells). That number declined to 145 killed and 689 injured in 2002.

Over 10 million landmines were planted by all sides of the conflict, although the Khmer Rouge set the most mines. In 2001 there were about 3,000 square kilometres of land needing to be cleared of mines and UXO. (The clearance rate is about 10 sq. km./year.) About 1,300 square miles of cultivatable land remains largely fallow due to land mine infestations.

Health and Education

Prior to the mid-1960s and the years of conflict that followed, most Cambodians lived on small, self-sufficient farms. The country was a net exporter of rice. Production drastically declined during the Pol Pot era of collectivisation when deaths due to starvation were common. Agricultural production increased with the restoration of private ownership in 1989. In recent years, Cambodia has made great strides in reducing hunger.

- About 62% of the population were undernourished (lack of sufficient calories) in 1980; in

1996 that percent declined to 33.

- The undernourished rate for children less than 5 is 36% today, with 45% of children moderately or severely under weight and the same percentage are stunted.
- Child and maternal mortality rates of 138 and 590, respectively, are high, while Cambodia's Human Development Index (HDI) rank is low (130 of 175).
- A major health issue and cause for alarm is Cambodia's adult HIV prevalence rate of 2.7%. If not checked, HIV/AIDS may soon pass from the most vulnerable to the general population.
- Most people live in rural areas where only 26% of the population have access to safe water and 10% to adequate sanitation.
- As nutrition, literacy in Cambodia has substantially increased. The adult literacy rate is 69%, and 65% of children are enrolled in pre-primary or primary schools.

Economic devastation

Years of conflict and detrimental actions by the Khmer Rouge government devastated Cambodia's economy. What little industry existed was destroyed by the mid-1970s. From a rice and rubber exporter, the country became a net rice importer. The Asian Development Bank says that Cambodia is still recovering from 20 plus years of war.

- Today, rubber plantations are being revived and expanded. An unfortunate price is the replacement of natural forests by rubber trees.
- Timber, tourists, garments and rubber (in that order) are Cambodia's four main sources of external funds. About 56% of the country is forested; ½ under government control. Deforestation rates are high, often due to illegal clearing practices on both private and government controlled lands. Some efforts are now being made to check the worst abusers (usually foreign-owned companies).
- Tourism has rapidly increased since the mid-1990s. Cambodia is one of the world's prime destinations of sex tourism. Under pressure from local and international NGOs (non-governmental organisations), the government has made some efforts to curb abuses of paedophile and pimps in efforts to improve the country's image. Removing the Khmer Rouge threat permitted the historical temple area, truly one of the marvels of the world, to be open to thousands of tourists annually.
- Garment-making is Cambodia's largest manufacturer and accounts for 12% of the nation's exports.
- The anti-Thai riots in January 2003 caused US \$50 million in damage.
- GDP (gross domestic product) per capita increased 1.7% per year in 1999 and 2000. GDP increased 4.5% in 2002 and is expected to exceed 6% in 2003.
- Cambodia remains a poor nation, partly due to years of conflict. ODA (overseas development assistance) remains high, accounting for about 12% of GNP (gross national product) and about 70% of the government budget. FDI (foreign direct investment) increased from 0% in 1990 to 3.3% in 2001.

Debt

Cambodia's total external debt at the close of 2001 was US \$2.7 billion. Public and publicly

guaranteed debt amounted to US \$2.4 billion. The World Bank lists Cambodia as a “moderately-indebted low-income” nation.

Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs

chechnya - russian federation

Background

Chechnya is a nightmare come true – for Russia, for the Caucasus and especially for Chechens. Since 1992 Chechnya has faced two bouts of brutal warfare separated by three-years of general anarchy and low-degree conflict. The Chechnya Republic claimed independence in 1991 and adopted its own constitution a year later. Moscow did not accept Chechen independence and in December 1994 Russian forces invaded the Republic.

Two years of conflict followed and hundreds of Chechen rebels died. Russia claims to have lost 5,500 soldiers, but the count of dead troops was probably twice that amount. Civilians suffered the most in terms of loss of lives, homes and livelihoods. An estimated 80,000 to 100,000 non-combatants were killed before Russian forces left after the peace agreement in December 1996.

Part of the peace plan called for Russian help to rebuild Chechnya. This aid never materialized, anarchy predominated, and rebel factions continued to operate with a rise in warlords within Chechnya. Hostage taking became a major source of income. Aid workers were among the kidnapped and murdered.

Conflict re-ignited in 1999 when Chechen rebels led by militant Shamil Basayev attempted to ferment an anti-Russian rebellion. Russian President Boris Yeltsin gave his Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin responsibility for finding a solution to the Chechen problem. Putin withdrew Russia’s recognition of the Chechen head of state and has since refused to negotiate with the independent Chechen leadership.

Russia renewed military operations in October 1999. By February 2000 the devastated Chechen capital, Grozny, was captured. Rebels were cleared from most cities by the end of summer 2000, but they have remained active, regularly attacking Russian forces.

Since autumn 2001 a stalemate in the conflict was becoming apparent. Russian forces control the more populous lowlands by day. Chechen rebels engaged in guerrilla warfare control most of the mountainous terrain and urban areas by night. Generally speaking, this is the situation that exists today with two significant exceptions. First, rebels are targeting civilians who are seen to be co-operating with Russia. Civilian targets outside Chechnya are also fair game, as witnessed by the hostage-taking attempt in a Moscow theatre in October 2002 resulting in the deaths of 80 rebels and 120 civilians. Second, there is a rise in suicide bombers.²⁰

The Russian government downplays the rise in guerrilla activities and generally disregards outcries on the part of the humanitarian community regarding human rights abuses. President Putin is confident that the West is too preoccupied by other events to bother about what’s happening in Chechnya. He seemingly has convinced U.S. President Bush that Chechen rebels are international terrorists.

In March 2003, a referendum was held to approve a new constitution for Chechnya that keeps the Republic within the Russian Federation. In September 2003, Russian operations in Chechnya

²⁰ A third possible change in tactics by Chechen rebels is another attempt to spread the conflict into neighbouring Ingushetia and Dagestan.

were handed over to Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) from the FSB to signal that a “normalizing” process is underway now that the “war is over.”²¹ October 2003 saw the rigged election of Putin-picked Akhmad Kadyrov as President of Chechnya.

Despite Kremlin actions and statements, the conflict is far from over. Russian military “mopping-up” operations continue, netting few rebels, but terrorizing civilians. Guerrilla attacks have increased, not only on Russian forces but on civilians as well. Despite this, negotiations with rebel factions are still out of the question for the Kremlin.

The assassination on May 9, 2004 of the President of the Republic of Chechnya, Akhmad Kadyrov, will have long-lasting and grave repercussions for the people of Chechnya. The violent attack can only mean further destabilization and threatens to open a new element in the existing conflict with the power vacuum left by Kadyrov's death.

Cost

Casualties

In terms of human lives lost, the cost of the Chechen wars has been horrific.

- To the 80,000-100,000 civilians killed in the 1994-1996 war, an estimated 6,500-15,000 died in conflict-related causes between September 1999 and November 2003. In other words, between 11.5% and 15.3% of the Chechen population were killed in conflict.
- Between 1999 and June 2003, more than 3,000 people have “disappeared,” both through actions of the Russian military and rebels. Most of the disappeared are probably dead.
- At least 25,000 Russian soldiers have been killed in the two conflicts.
- The number of rebels killed is unknown, as the militants remove their fallen comrades from scenes of battle.

Displacement

The Chechen wars have few equals as measured in percent of population affected.

- The 1994-1996 war displaced about 80% of the population, some 600,000 people.
- The present conflict has uprooted about 140,000 people within Chechnya. Some 84,000 escaped to Ingushetia, 8,000 to Dagestan and 10,000 to countries outside Russia, primarily Azerbaijan.²² By November 2003 about 1/3rd of Chechens were displaced.
- Throughout 2003 authorities have used strong-arm tactics to coerce Chechens to leave displacement camps in Ingushetia and return to Chechnya. Since January 2003, about 20,000 have done so.

Economy

The Chechen wars have taken a hash toll.

- In 2001, the war consumed 2% of the Russian Federation budget.
- Chechnya was a significant oil producer before the wars. Officially, production dropped 91% since the mid-1990s. Unofficially, oil that is illegally extracted and refined into low-grade

²¹ In May 2003, there were 38,000 Russian troops in Chechnya, a number that Putin hopes to substantially reduce.

²² In addition, 67,000 ethnic Russians left Chechnya during the 1994-1996 conflict.

gasoline has become an important industry.

- Chechnya no longer benefits from a pipeline that once transported petroleum from within its territory and other areas.

Economically, Chechnya is a dead zone. Most factories were destroyed, as were most cities. Electric, telephone, sewer, water, roads, oil production equipment and other infrastructure need to be extensively repaired or rebuilt.

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democratic republic of the congo

Background

Before the onset of civil war in 1996, the government of the DRC was perhaps the world's most corrupt. President and dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, his relatives and a cadre of military and civilian appointees did little more than pillage the country for 32 years. Except in the East, the dilapidated shape of the country's infrastructure, poor health care and education systems and lack of economic development other than mining, are legacies of the Mobutu era more than recent warfare.

Mobutu fled the country in May 1997 following a series of amazingly swift victories by rebel forces under the leadership of Laurent-Desire Kabila, who was proclaimed president of a transitional government. Resentment of his autocratic actions, falling out with his Rwandan and Ugandan allies and unrest in the restive Eastern Congo culminated in military conflict in July 1998 when Kabila issued a decree expelling Rwandan troops from the DRC. Rwanda, Uganda and their rebel allies then went into a war mode.

This new set of insurgents made rapid gains in the East. The Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) was the main group and chiefly composed of ethnic Tutsis. RCD was joined by the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC); both forces were supported by Rwanda and Uganda. Sensing his government's vulnerability, Kabila contracted military alliances with Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Chad and Sudan. In addition, the government supported various rebel groups in the East, especially the Mayi-Mayi.

While Angolan troops helped secure the West for Kabila, the East largely remained under rebel control. The main barrier to further rebel advances was not the government and allied forces but their own divisions and in fighting. The RCD split in two, then into four factions: RCD-G (Goma) allied with Rwanda, RCD-K/LM (Kisangani/Liberation Movement) supported by Uganda and the smaller RCD-N (National) and RCD-O (original), both Uganda backed. The rebel splits reflected the growing friction between Rwanda and Uganda.

Stalemate in the war and cost to outside parties set the stage for a ceasefire in July 1999, signed by rebel forces a month later. Hostilities continued, though, often among rebel forces and with a distinct ethnic cast. Conflict was overshadowed by the assassination of Kabila in January 2001 and the quick succession by his son Joseph as president. In February 2001 the UN Security Council drew up a plan for the disengagement of all foreign troops. With Rwanda's belated departure, all international soldiers left the DRC in 2002.

Through the efforts of the African Union (AU), all parties agreed to two-year power sharing transitional government in June 2003. The 500 seat National Assembly and 120 member Senate met in August 2003. Due to delays, the executive branch with Joseph Kabila as president, four

vice-presidents representing the rebel groups, 36 ministers and 24 vice-ministers did not take office until September 2003. The new DRC army is composed of forces from the former government, MLC, RCD (G, K/LM and N) and the Mayi-Mayi militias. Peacekeeping oversight is provided by MONUC II (UN Observer Mission for the Congo). In an effort to reduce tensions, the World Bank presented DRC with a US \$164 million grant and US \$50 million loan in September 2003.

Some of the conflict in the DRC may have understandable origins, such as ethnic hatred or even acts of genocide. Militias begun in a “need” to defend lives or livelihoods, however, soon evolve into armed groups held together by “greed.” As reported by Transparency International: “In the DRC, valuable mineral resources provided the incentive for international companies to deal with rebels, with revenues transferred into personal bank accounts that were used to obtain more arms to sustain the war.”²³ The DRC has plentiful reserves of copper, zinc, cobalt, gold, silver, tin, coal, diamonds and coltran (used in cell phones). In addition, the country may have large oil and natural gas deposits off shore and in the Congo River estuary.

Cost

Hoped for peace in the DRC still hasn’t been achieved. Ethnic warfare intensified in the East, particularly in the Ituri District of Oriental Province, during the first half of 2003. Especially vicious was the Hema-Lendu conflict, responsible for 3,000 deaths and 300,000 internally displaced people (IDPs). Today a precarious truce prevails among the five mostly ethnic militias, four of whom are allied to Uganda and one to Rwanda.²⁴

As disturbing as the resent conflict in Ituri is, it pales besides the damage done in this District and elsewhere in the DRC since 1996.

Death, displacement and hunger

Over the past 4 years, the death toll in Ituri exceeded 60,000 while 500,000-600,000 people have been displaced.

- Between late 2002 and spring 2003, fighting between RCD-G and Mayi-Mayi in the Uvira area displaced about 30,000 people.
- Despite the 1998 ceasefire, between 200,000-400,000 people were displaced by conflict in Eastern DRC in 2002 alone.
- The total uprooted people (refugees and IDPs) since 1996 is unknown. Estimates place the number of refugees at 410,000 at the end of 2002. The IDP population is even harder to track. Through September 2003, rough calculations range from 2.3 million to 2.8 million. Conceivably, the total number of uprooted people could number over 3.2 million.
- At the close of 2002, most DRC refugees were housed in Tanzania (140,000), the Republic of the Congo (80,000) and Zambia (55,000 in November 2003).
- Over 90% of IDPs are in Eastern DRC. Estimates in 2002, assuming 2-2.5 million, were (by province): North Kivu, 750,000; South Kivu, 400,000; Katanga, 400,000; Oriental, to

²³ Claude Kabemba, “Central Africa,” *Global Corruption Report, 2003*, Transparency International p. 1, [http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/download/gcr2003/21_Central_Africa_\(Kabemba\).pdf](http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/download/gcr2003/21_Central_Africa_(Kabemba).pdf)

²⁴ In October 2003, Ituri militia factions agreed to contonment. By November 2003, 700 Mayi-Mayi militia were demobilised.

250,000; and Maniema, 150,000.²⁵

- From August 1998 through December 2002 the civil war is directly or indirectly (disease, hunger) responsible for 3-5 million deaths. Most of the direct killing was done by small arms and light weapons imported through neighbouring countries.
- Largely due to armed conflict, the World Food Programme (WFP) provided 483,000 people in Eastern DRC with food aid in August 2003. Yet about 17 million people face significant food shortages.

Health and education

- Child mortality in the DRC overall is 205, the world's 9th highest rate (about 20% of children die before their 5th birthday). In the war-torn East, it is probably over 1/3rd. Between 2000 and 2002, infant mortality increased by 40% in the East. Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF) reports that 50% of infant mortality in the DRC is associated with malnutrition. The DRC also has the globe's 7th highest maternal mortality rate.
- The official HIV/AIDS rate for the DRC is difficult to estimate due to the civil war, but it's probably over 5%. In the East, the HIV prevalence rate is likely to be well above the national average. By how much is unknown, as the National HIV/AIDS Programme cannot operate in this region. Due to widespread acts of rape by combatants, a fear is that HIV may be increasing rapidly in the East, an area where there are no prevention, care or treatment facilities. Currently in the DRC, there are an estimated 650,000 children who were orphaned by AIDS.
- The DRC is a country of disease, exacerbated by civil war. 2003 saw outbreaks of cholera, hemorrhagic fever, ebola, measles and virulent flu. Poliomyelitis, virtually wiped out in most other countries, remains endemic in the DRC.
- The adult literacy rate of 61% is bound to fall, partly due to civil conflict. In 1985-1987, 58% of children were attending primary school. By 1998 that percent dropped to 32.

Other

- Much of the sorry state of the nation's infrastructure, especially in the East, may be blamed on the civil war. Today, large sections of major highways are not usable. Hospitals, clinics, schools and factories were destroyed or are in terminal stages of decay. As in the case of Sierra Leone, Liberia and so many African countries, most of the schools and clinics are operated as part of the social mission of the Church.
- The average annual per capita GDP declined 5.1% from 1990 to 2000.
- Non-human species, too, have suffered because of war. For example, the large hippopotamus (*Hippopotamus amphibious*) population in DRC's eastern Virunda National Park has nearly been eliminated. Both the mountain gorilla (*Gorilla gorilla beringei*) and the Eastern Lowland gorilla (*Gorilla beringei graurie*) numbers were drastically reduced due to military and mining activities.

Debt

DRC's total external debt at the end of 2001 was US \$ 11.4 billion. Public and publicly

²⁵ December 2002 estimates of refugees and IDPs are from _____. *World Refugee Survey, 2003* (Washington U.S. Committee for Refugees), 2003, pp. 4, 6, 7, 8

guaranteed debt was US \$7.6 billion. The World Bank considers the DRC to be a “severely-indebted low-income” country.

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guatemala

Background

Peace accords signed in December 1996 ended 36 years of conflict. Central America’s longest civil war generally pitted the army and paramilitary forces against a coalition of guerrilla groups that coalesced under the Unidad Revolucionario Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) umbrella. To a large extent the civil war was between classes and ethnic groups. Since independence Guatemala has generally been ruled by military or army-backed civilian governments that represented the wealthier socio-economic ladino (mestizo) groups. The leftist URNG is largely composed of indigenous Mayan tribes who makeup 54% of Guatemala’s population but who constitute most of the country’s “poorest of the poor.”

Poverty is endemic among the Maya whose traditional agrarian mores resisted integration with that of the more commercially orientated ladino culture. Concerns over land use and rights, aggravated by the displacement of Mayas from their ancestral villages, were at the heart of the conflict. Cease-fire and peace negotiations were made especially difficult due to the complexity of the issues involved and deep distrust of the URNG towards the government and security forces. The army and its many death squads, aided by the Patrullas de Autodefensa (PAC) paramilitary, massacred thousands of Mayans – simply for being Mayan -- that the civil war took on aspects of genocide.

Guatemala’s prolonged civil war must also be seen in light of the “cold war” and U.S.-Former USSR relations. The U.S. government falsely labelled reformist President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman as a communist, then helped Col. Carlos Castillo Armas depose Arbenz from office in 1954. Generally, succeeding U.S. administrations backed Guatemala’s repressive military governments until the late 1980s, a shameful state of affairs admitted by former President Bill Clinton in 1999.²⁶

Unfortunately, peace has not resolved those causes of conflict imbedded in ethnicity, class and culture. Genuine land re-distribution as called for under the 1996 peace pact is yet to occur. Most of the land distributed to returning refugees, for example, is unproductive for agricultural purposes and lacking supportive infrastructure (roads, water, sanitation, schools). Over 200,000 PAC militia were demobilised by 1997 as well as 15,000 members of the security forces and 3,250 URNG guerrillas. Yet PAC has re-emerged as a powerful lobby group, demanding back pay as they supported the presidential candidacy of General Efraim Rios Montt in 2003. The government promised to cut another 6,000 soldiers. This belated commitment will reduce the army to about 30,000 combatants, primarily charged to patrol the nation’s borders. In violation of the peace accord, they are “assisting” the under funded civil police force in much of the interior of Guatemala. The despised military intelligence unit Estado Mayor Presidencial (EMP) was to be dissolved soon after peace, but it wasn’t disbanded until October 2003.

²⁶ President Arbenz attempted to enact much needed agrarian (land) reform that was strenuously opposed by the U.S.-owned United Fruit Co. Military sales to Guatemala were suspended from 1977-1983, although U.S. military training and CIA missions remained active.

Other worries resolve around the majority “no” vote of the 1998 referendum and the recent 2003 poll. Only 18% of the electorate voted in a confusing referendum to amend the 1985 constitution and bring it in alignment with the peace treaty. Defeated were measures to limit the military, increase the budget of the judiciary and efforts to officially recognise Guatemala’s rich multi-ethnicity. To the relief of most Guatemalans, Montt came in third place during the November presidential polls and will not take part in the run-off election.²⁷ However, his right-wing FRG (Frente Republicano Guatemalteco) party did very well in congressional and local elections.

Cost

Guatemalans paid a heavy price in deaths for 36 years of conflict. About 200,000 people, mostly Mayan civilians, were killed or “disappeared” during the civil war. Over 90% of the killing was done by security forces. Between ½ to 1½ million people were internally displaced. Another 250,000 escaped the country, 150,000 to Mexico. Since 1996, about 43,000 returned.

Undoubtedly the civil war added to Guatemala’s low performance in education and health measures. While the official primary school attendance rate is 84%, 81% of rural children drop out of school and 50% of urban girls are illiterate. The adult functional literacy rate is 30-32%, ranking Guatemala as one of the most illiterate nations in Latin America.²⁸ Similarly, health-related figures paint a dismal picture.

- High child and maternal mortality rates of 58 and 190, respectively.
- 29% and 46% of children under 5 are moderately to severely underweight and stunted, respectively.
- These figures are not surprising as the WFP (World Food Programme) reported in 2002 that 46% of Guatemala’s children less than 5 were malnourished (67% of Mayan children).

Guatemala’s overall economic picture is mixed.

- The CEH (Commission for Historical Clarification) reported that the country recorded no economic growth from 1980-1989.
- War was also responsible for loss of infrastructure, tax revenue and economic opportunity. The CEH estimated the latter as 14% of 1990 GDP (gross domestic product).
- The per capita GDP only grew 1.4% annually between 1990 and 2001. In 2002, per capita growth was 2%. To a degree, the rise of export manufacture of garments offset the sharp decline of coffee prices.
- Despite endemic hunger, high illiteracy, reduction of soldiers and under funding for the judiciary and civil police force, the country’s military budget is still increasing, largely due to salary expenditures. The national budget, already hard hit Hurricane Mitch in 1998 and the drastic fall in coffee prices, will soon be stretched further to pay compensation to 250,000 former PAC combatants.
- The gap between rich and poor in Guatemala remains one of the world’s largest. The 10% lowest income families receive 1.6% of the country’s income and the poorest 20% only 3.8% of the nation’s wealth. The respective income figures for the wealthiest 10% and 20% groups

²⁷ Oscar Berger of the GANA (Gran Alianza Nacional de Guatemala) coalition will face Alvaro Colom of the UNE (Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza).

²⁸ The official adult literacy rate is 56%.

are 46% and 60%. About 60% of the population lives below the national poverty line.

Debt

Guatemala's total external debt at the end of 2001 was US \$5 billion. Public and publicly guaranteed debt was US \$3.5 billion. The World Bank lists Guatemala as a "less-indebted middle-income" country.

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haiti

Background

President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president in December 1990 following 32 years of Duvalier dictatorships and four years of military rule. The current conflict in Haiti followed Aristide's election and escalated during the coup d'état by the military a year later that removed him from office. Hundred of people were killed as the junta-led government headed by Gen. Raoul Cédras seized power. Condemnation of the coup was swift. Embargoes and sanctions by the UN and OAS (Organization of American States) followed.

Facing unpopularity at home and abroad, the junta first agreed then balked on accords to bring back the elected government. In response, economic sanctions were placed on Haiti followed by a total embargo on Haitian exports and imports in May 1994. Expulsion of the UN/OAS Civil Commission to Haiti in July 1994 and continued intransigence by the junta led to the landing of U.S.-led UN troops in September 1994. The Haitian military generally co-operated with the UNMIH (UN Mission in Haiti). Cédras and other junta leaders were not prosecuted but permitted to leave Haiti. All sanctions were dropped, and Aristide returned in October 1994 to a tumultuous welcome. Unfortunately security deteriorated, and U.S. forces stayed until February 1996. UN peacekeepers in the role of MIPONUH (UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti) left in November 1997.

Some of Haiti's insecurity was due to a lack of qualified police, but mainly to the failure of the disarmament initiated by the U.S. and UN troops. MIPONUH's role was to train security forces; a task that required months to adequately accomplish.²⁹ Political turmoil was another reason for lack of security. The constitution prevented Aristide from running for a consecutive term. However, he encouraged his Prime Minister, Rene Garcia Preval, to do so. Both Preval's victory in November 1995 and the legislative poll that followed were contested by opposition parties. To further compound the problem, the second round of the 1997 municipal and local elections were boycotted by most of the opposition parties, and only 5% of eligible voters cast their ballots. The results were denounced as fraudulent. Riots in Port au-Prince and political squabbling in the legislative led to the resignation of Prime-Minister Rosny Smarth. Parliament rejected other Preval nominees and blocked government programs. Without a prime minister confirmed by Parliament, there was no legal government and millions of dollars in international aid were lost.³⁰ Concurrently, Aristide criticized Preval for the President's privatization program.

Aristide became the FL (Fanmi Lavalas) party candidate for president in the November 2000

²⁹ In 1994 the armed forces and police were disbanded, and a 3,000-member Interim Public Security Force, subsequently called the Haitian National Police was formed in 1995 under the auspices of MIPONUH.

³⁰ Preval dismissed parliament, appointed Jacques Edward Alexis as PM and ruled by presidential decree in January 1999.

elections. Not surprising, he won. But capturing 91.8% of the vote was too incredulous for opposing candidates to believe. As a result, most opposition parties refused to confirm Aristide as president. Nor has the opposition recognized the legitimacy of the May 2000 and July 2002 parliamentary elections in which FL candidates won 72 of 83 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 26 of 27 in the Senate. The second Aristide presidency has been just as chaotic and violent as Preval's, with Haitians having lost confidence in the man once revered by the poor.

Costs

Highlights of events since 2000 include some of the costs of conflict.

The armed conflict of early 2004 precipitated President Aristide's departure from the country. Aristide, however, maintains that he is still President of Haiti since he was forced to resign from office against his will. Most of the country remains in UN Security Phase III, including Port-au-Prince. The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) will replace the current Multinational Interim Force (MIF) mandated by Security Council Resolution 1529. With Resolution 1542 of 30 April 2004, the Security Council authorised MINUSTAH's deployment of 6,700 troops and 1,622 police on 1 June 2004. The UN peacekeepers enter an environment of unrest that had been mounting for several years:

- Protests and riots by Aristide opponents and counter protests including widespread violence against the opposition and non-FL media. These include November 2002 clashes in Petit-Gave, Cap Haitian and Gonaïves and July 2003 demonstrations that turned violent in Port-au-Prince.
- Haiti is awash in small arms. A growing number of local FL officials more resemble local warlords with militias than elected government representatives.
- The National Campaign to reduce the number of guns has met with little success in disarming gangs of private militia.
- Haiti's middle class and the business community were never attracted to Aristide. Due to the chronic political turmoil accompanied by urban violence, an association of business interests termed the situation in Haiti a "climate of terror."
- Businesses and church groups, local NGOs (non-governmental organizations) and other representatives of civil society formed "Group 184" in a call for social, economic and political change.
- The strongest opposition to FL is found in the Convergence Démocratique (CD) Party alliance. CD is a fractious group of neo-Duvalierists on the extreme right and politicians holding centre-left beliefs.
- CD refuses to recognize the validity of the 2000 and 2002 elections. Nor does CD believe that FL is trying to disarm gangs of thugs that intimidate and disrupt elections. A prime example is the "Cannibal Army" in Gonaïves.
- CD, along with human rights and Catholic and Protestant groups, refused to take part in the OAS-supported Provisional Electoral Council (PEC). Not only have elections for the legislature been postponed into 2004, but until July 2003, so too had much needed international aid and loans. CD's intransigence in refusing to participate in the PEC and the electoral process might be self-defeating.
- CD resembles more an alliance of cranky Aristide-discontents than a political party with a common vision and goal. Despite popular disenchantment with FL, CD was not perceived by

the majority of the population as a good alternative to Aristide, at least prior to his departure in 2004.

- The OAS, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), UN and other segments of the international community are likely to proceed with overseeing the elections and renewing aid programs in the belief that CD is unlikely to compromise.
- The OAS, tired of the stalling tactics of CD and believing that Haiti may be heading towards a completely lawless society, is likely to strongly push for elections in early 2004 with or without CD participation. If legislative elections aren't held soon, Aristide may rule by decree, as the term limits of 2/3rds of the Senate and all Depute seats are out by January 2004.
- Some of the promised US \$500 million in international aid frozen since 2000 is being released. The government made a back payment to the IMF (International Monetary Fund) in July 2003 of US \$32 million and was granted an immediate loan of US \$50 million and agreement for four additional loans totalling US \$145.9 million.³¹
- The IDB also loaned Haiti US \$220 million in July 2003.
- The U.S. government maintains a hostile attitude towards Aristide and his government. Yet because most other countries in the Americas see no other choice than to work with Aristide, the U.S. is likely to resume aid after elections in 2004. Aid from North America is significant and accounted for 20% of Haiti's GDP (gross domestic product) in 2000.

Economy

Since 1993 Haiti's economy has been seriously ailing, worsened by the crisis in 2004. Real or inflation adjusted GDP grew 2.1% in 1999 but slipped to 1.2% in 2000. Real GDP per person declined -2.5% annually between 1990 and 2001. In per capita GNP (gross national product) terms, the decline was 4.4% in recent years. Already the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, poverty in Haiti is deepening. About 2/3rds of Haitians live at a subsistence level, most of whom are small peasant farmers. Still, 60% of the country's food is imported. Haiti must import all its petroleum products, generally explaining why most of the country has electricity only four hours each day.

More than 70% of jobs are in the informal sector, with high under and unemployment rates. Although textiles account for 85% of Haiti's exports, this and other export industries such as toys, sports equipment, clothing and electronics suffered greatly from the 1991-1994 embargo. Since then, chronic political instability, lawlessness and corruption have generally discouraged foreign investment.³² Only overseas remittances from relatives and friends prevented have prevented greater misery, even starvation.³³

Other costs

- Haitians are hungry. In 2000 the UN reported that Haiti was the world's third hungriest country (after Somalia and Afghanistan). About half of Haiti's people (3.8 million) are profoundly undernourished. This probably means that the surprisingly low number of children under 5 who are moderately to severely underweight (23%), stunted (23%) or

³¹ The loans are for infrastructure improvements of health and educational facilities and road and water systems. As a condition of the loan, IMF staff will monitor government economic stabilisation and reform programmes.

³² Transparency International ranked Haiti as the world's third most corrupt countries (rank of 131 of 133) in 2003.

³³ US \$800 million in private remittances were sent to Haiti in 2001, or over 20% of the nation's GDP.

wasting (5%) is incorrect.³⁴

- Haiti's child mortality rate of 123 ranks the country at 38 where 193 is best (Sweden). The maternal mortality rate of 520 is also very high. The adult HIV adult prevalence rate of 6% is one of the highest rates in Latin America and the Caribbean.
- About 37% of the population has access to clean water and 28% to adequate sanitation.
- Haiti's adult literacy rate is 49%. About 54% of children are attending primary school.
- Haiti's depressed economy and lawlessness have encouraged employment in illegal drug trafficking. About 7% of the cocaine sold in the U.S. passes through Haiti.
- The country is an ecological nightmare. Most of the nation has been deforested. Haiti ranks 5th from the bottom (137 of a 142) on the Environmental Sustainable Index scale.
- Basic infrastructure maintenance – roads, ports, water and sewer systems, schools and medical facilities – has been neglected.

Debt

Haiti's total external debt at the close of 2001 was US \$1.25 billion. The public and publicly guaranteed debt was US \$1 billion. The World Bank lists Haiti as a "moderately-indebted low-income" country.

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Lebanon

Background

The dates of Lebanon's civil war are generally given as 1975-1991. In April 1975 Phalangist (Christian) militants ambushed a bus killing 27, mostly Palestinian Muslims. The government soon resigned and the economy came to a standstill in the conflict that followed. The civil war officially ended when most parties agreed to the Taif Accords in December 1990.

At first blush, it would be easy to say that the war was between Christian groups who wished to retain political power and Muslims who wanted more control. Indeed, that was a contributing cause. Yet the issue is more complex, as both Christian and Muslim factions were divided among themselves. Occasionally those splits led to internecine warfare, spawning 53 private armies or militias by 1981. Lebanon was also affected by external forces, especially other countries in the Middle East that, in turn, were vying for hegemony in the region. These states included Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, to a lesser extent Jordan and to a much greater extent Israel and Syria.

Some key events during Lebanon's 25-year civil war include:

- In November 1976 the Syrian-led Arab Deterrence Force entered Lebanon upon the request of the Christian leaders and stopped much of the fighting between Phalangist militia and the mostly Muslim Lebanese National Movement (LNM).³⁵ The militias, however, remained active. The Maronite (Roman Catholic) Lebanese Forces (LF) generally controlled

³⁴ Reliability of UN data is dependent on nationally-derived figures.

³⁵ Previously at odds, Lebanese and Palestinian Muslims joined forces to form the LNM.

parts of East Beirut, Mount Lebanon and north Lebanon; Syrian Muslims through the LNM, West Beirut; and the Palestinian militias dominated the south-west.

- After the Camp David agreement, the Syrian forces in Lebanon shifted their allies and supported the LNM against the Phalangists).
- Israeli invaded South Lebanon in 1978 and made retaliatory raids on Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established in the south. In September 1978, the Israeli pulled out to a smaller section of the South Lebanon “security belt” and established the South Lebanon Army militia. Fighting periodically flared up in Beirut and other areas.
- Israel invaded again in June 1982, particularly targeting PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organisation) fighters in refugee camps. The Israeli army encouraged Phalangists to enter the camps; they did so and slaughtered 2,000 people. This event was also triggered by the assassination of the Lebanese newly elected president, former Phalangists’ party head. UN peacekeepers were deployed. In August 1982 most PLO fighters departed for other Arab countries based on an agreement with Israel and sponsored by the U.S. government. Multinational forces entered Beirut to act as peacekeepers but were attacked by suicide-bombers. Over 400 U.S. marines and French troops were killed, an event that led to their withdrawal.
- Also in 1982, a Lebanese National Resistance military group, supported by Syria, was established to fight the Israeli occupation. This resistance still exists but has adopted another identity that is Islamic rather than Nationalistic (Amal and Hizbollah, Shi’ite militias).
- In 1983, Israeli forces withdrew to the deep south of the country and started retracting gradually till they reached again the “security belt”. During and after the Israeli withdrawal, fights in Lebanon took another dimension: fanaticism grew tremendously resulting in Amal movement becoming a 100% Shiite militia, Phalangists (Lebanese Forces) 100% Christian, the socialists party 100% Druze, the Islamic Tawhid 100% Sunnite, and the creation of Hizbollah (shiite party).
- Syrian forces have never left, and were especially strong in Beirut, the North and the Beka’a Valley. The mid-1980s was a time of intense fighting sandwiched between broken cease-fires. Palestinians and Syrian Muslims battle for control of al_Fatah. Muslim militias regarded the reconstituted national army as a Christian force. Shi’a and Sunni factions engaged in sporadic fighting. In 1986, Amal (Shi’a) fighters battled Palestinian guerrillas in and around refugee camps resulting in 2,500 deaths, and in 1987 intense warfare erupted across the “Green Line” in Beirut.³⁶
- In 1988, the mandate of president Amine Gemayel ended. He assigned General Michel Aoun, leader of the Lebanese Army, as the head of the cabinet of ministers who were appointed from the Lebanese Army. In actuality, a military government was established. The Muslim ministers withdrew from this cabinet, forming another led by the former prime-minister.
- The decade ended and the 1990s began with more fighting. In March 1989 Aoun’s army battled the Syrian forces in Beirut and clashed with the Christian LF in January 1990. Aoun’s militia was defeated by the Syrian and Lebanese armies; Aoun was expelled from the country; and all militias left Beirut in December 1990.

³⁶ Since 1984, the mostly Christian East Beirut was separated from the mostly Muslim West Beirut by the Green Line.

- A cease-fire and peace became possible due to the October 1989 Taif Accord made possible through mediation by the Arab League. The Accord specified power-sharing arrangement between Christians and Muslims in which the president would be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, the speaker of the Assembly a Shi'a Muslim and the 124 member Assembly would be equally composed of Christians and Muslims. Other key elements of the Accord were the demobilisation of all militia and that the Syrian army pull-back to the Beka'a Valley and eventual negotiations with the Lebanese government for all Syrian troops to leave the country.³⁷
- By February 1991 the Lebanese army was in control of most of southern Lebanon but not the border area that pitted Israeli forces and their protégé, the Southern Lebanese Army (SLA) against Hizbollah, supported by Syria and Iran. By June 1991 the Lebanese army displaced the PLO for control of the Palestinian refugee camps.
- Yet it wasn't until May 2000 that Israel quit southern Lebanon, hoping that the SLA would maintain control of the border area. This was not to be. Hizbollah with more arms and men soon trumped the SLA.

In abrogation of both the letter and spirit of the Taif Accords, about 22,000 Syrian troops remain in Lebanon, primarily in the Beka'a Valley. Syrian political and economic influence remains very strong. All Lebanese government actions are pro-Syria, which often puts Lebanon at odds with the U.S. that is often considered pro-Israeli to certain groups. In both 2000 and 2001 Beirut witnessed a number of protests against Syrian influence in Lebanon.

Cost

Death and displacement

Lebanon's 25-year civil war was expensive in terms of human lives. An estimated 170,000 people were killed, 300,000 injured and 800,000 displaced. At the close of 2002, there were still about 300,000 IDPs (internally displaced people) in the country. These figures do not include the thousands of people that were categorized as missing and or were kidnapped during the war.

Good governance

Creation of effective, democratic governance may be a cost of the war. Undoubtedly the government sharing agreement in the Taif Accord helped bring about peace. Adjustments are now needed to recognise that representation apportioned by religion is inherently unstable, for no other reason than the proportion of people belonging to religious groups changes over time. That the president must a Maronite assumes that Christianity is the majority religion and that Maronites are the majority of Christians. The latter is true, but the former is not, as about 60% of Lebanese today are Muslim. The position of prime minister goes to a Sunni under the assumption that this is the dominant Muslim persuasion. It's not, as the estimated Shi'ite population of 1.3 million is double the Sunni of 620,000. Lebanon's governments were weak and ineffective during the war and not much has changed today.

Infrastructure

About 1/4th of the housing was destroyed or substantially damaged. The telephone system was

³⁷ Final approval of the Taif Accord was delayed due to strong opposition from Aoun, who wanted all Syrian troops out of Lebanon. Amal, Hizbollah and Druze forces under Valid Jumblatt also opposed Taif but eventually (Amal, Hizbollah) or reluctantly (Jumblatt) agreed. Hizbollah was the only militia granted permission to remain armed. The largely LF Christian militia split over Taif, but the more militant group under Samir Geagea was dismantled in May 1994.

in tatters, the electric supply rendered unreliable, and road, water and sewage systems in disrepair. The estimated price of rebuilding Beirut was estimated at US \$25 billion. Much reconstruction was done through *Solidaire*, a unique private-public company that was the brainchild of al-Hariri during his first term as prime minister. Since the end of the war, the situation has improved. Today Lebanon mainly suffers from corruption in the privatisation process that results in some deprivations in services such as electricity, water, telephone and sewage systems.

Economy

The cost of the war on the economy was so great that Lebanon hasn't recovered. Before the war, Lebanon was the financial, insurance, transportation and tourist hub of the Middle East. The war nearly ruined the economy, lowering the average income by 2/3rds. Recovery has been mixed. In the early years after the war, led by *Solidaire* the real-estate industry not only led all other sectors of the economy, it was the only truly viable one. Between 1991 and 2001 the GDP (gross domestic product) grew by 14% annually as the per capita GNP (gross national product) more than tripled and inflation tumbled from 15% in 1990 to .5% in 2000. By August 1994 the stock market that closed in 1984 was reopened.

Much of Lebanon's rapid recovery was attributed to al-Hariri's "Horizon 2000" US \$ 20 billion reconstruction programme of which *Solidaire* was one part. A great deal of expatriate money and investments from Arab countries flowed into Lebanon. The country borrowed heavily believing that debt could readily be repaid in a rebounding economy. The government counted on a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the region. It focused on service sector rehabilitation aimed at restoring to Lebanon its leading tourist role in the region. This hasn't happened as expected. Instead, Lebanon has one of the world's highest per capita debt burdens. In 2002, debt was 173% of GDP, servicing the debt took 18% of GDP and debt consumed 48% of government spending.³⁸ The Paris II meetings should provide some relief, as US \$3.1 billion in long terms loans at favourable rates complemented by US \$1.3 billion in "soft" loans will replace high interest indentures.

High debt payments are an indication that Lebanon's entered a recession in the mid-1990s to which it hasn't emerged.³⁹ Real (inflation adjusted) GDP fell from growing 3.5% in 1995 to 1% in 1998 and 1999 to a negative 0.7% in 2000. The Lebanese pound is overvalued, but the country doesn't wish to devalue its currency for fear of driving up inflation. The stalled recovery/recession is especially hard on unskilled people. The under and unemployment rate was 20% in 2001. Just as serious, the income gap between the better-paid and lower income groups is increasing.⁴⁰ Unfortunately for Lebanon, perceptions of government instability, periodic incidences of violence, Syrian hegemony and corruption⁴¹ have discouraged foreign investment.

Moreover, the Lebanese industrial and agricultural sectors are weak mainly due to the government's negligence and outside interference. For instance, Lebanese farmers complain that cheaper Syrian products flood the market. Unemployed Lebanese are not happy with one million Syrians living and working in their country.

³⁸ Payment of government salaries and interest on debt consumed over 74% of the national budget in 1997.

³⁹ Another war cost was the brain drain of 150,000 highly trained people and their families. The exit by the educated restarted in the mid-1990s during Lebanon's recession.

⁴⁰ The situation in the south is far worse than the rest of the nation. In this war-torn area long under Israel control, 5,200 homes were destroyed and 20,000 damaged. Road, water and electrical systems were severely damaged. About 175,000 of a 440,000 population left or were displaced. Average incomes are about 1/4th of the national mean wage.

⁴¹ Transparency International ranks corruption in Lebanon as moderately high (73 where 133 is the worst).

Disillusionment of youth

Another cost of the war is the youth despair of the country and its future. Lebanese youth are still more than eager to leave the country, and on daily basis queues are formed in front of embassies' gates. The war has formed gaps between the different denominations of the country. A sense of belonging is more religious than national. The actions of the government as well as the outside interference are outrageous to some. The wounds of the war did not heal as yet but were inherited from one generation to the next. Many fear that the Lebanese people are ready for another round of violence.

Other costs

- As many as 400,000 landmines were planted in the area near the border with Israel. Since the Israeli pullout in 2000, 35 people were killed and 192 injured by mine and UXO (unexploded bombs and artillery shells) detonations. About 60,000 landmines were removed since 2000.
- Before the war, Lebanon's social indicators approached those of industrialised countries. Health and education systems were negatively impacted during the war but since have shown signs of recovery. From 1990 to 2001, male illiteracy decreased from 12% to 8% and female illiteracy from 27% to 19%. During this same decade infant immunization increased from 61% to 94% of all children.

Debt

Lebanon's total external debt at the end of 2001 was US \$12.45 billion. Public and publicly guaranteed debt was US \$ 9 billion. The World Bank considers Lebanon to be a "moderately-indebted middle-income" country.

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liberia

Background

Liberia has been at war with itself for most of the last 14 years. Following many years of political instability, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor began an uprising against the government in 1989. In less than a year rebels entered Monrovia. An interim transitional government headed by Amos Sawyer was established but one in which Taylor did not participate.

The next six years may be characterised as a period of bloodletting, chaos and terror. Despite the best efforts of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West Africa States), with some assistance from the UNOMIL (UN Observer Mission in Liberia), conflict dominated as truce after truce was quickly broken or ignored. Taylor's NPFL remained both the most intransigent and the most significant armed force. The NPFL continually fought other rebel groups, periodically engaged in combat with government troops and even battled ECOMOG (ECOWAS' Monitoring Group).

One reason that the civil war lasted so long because rebel groups were primarily ethnic-based. They fought among themselves more than they did against government troops. NPFL's core was drawn from the Kissi, Gio and Mano tribes. ULIMO (United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia) formed in 1992 but split a year later. ULIMO-K was chiefly Mandingo

(Mandinka), led by Alhaji Kromah. Roosevelt Johnson headed the ULIMO-J, an ethnic Krahn force. One of the smaller groups, the Liberian Peace Council (LPC) combatants were also Krahn; another, the LDF (Lofa Defence Force) was Lorma (Loma).

Regularly, rebel groups formed new alliances. Perhaps the most dramatic was NPFL's association with ULIMO-K; interesting due to Taylor's expressed distrust towards Mandingos. Yet his antipathy to ethnic Krahns was stronger. The showdown occurred at the Barclay Barracks in Monrovia leading to the defeat of UNLIMO-J and the LCP in May 1996. The subsequent peace agreement in August led to the dismantling of forces by January 1997 and culminated in the election of Charles Taylor as President of Liberia in July of that year.

Still, peace could be measured in months rather than years. The new government's forces clashed with ULIMO-J remnants in March 1998. Roosevelt Johnson was extradited by the U.S., a service that probably saved his life. Taylor felt confident enough to ask ECOMOG to leave in 1999. The Nigerian contingent was happy to do so, as their nine-year duty cost the lives of 500 soldiers and US \$8 billion. Unfortunately for Taylor, ECOMOG's destruction of weapons rendered them unavailable for his security forces.

Rebels took advantage of ECOMOG's departure and entered Liberia from Guinea in 1999. Government forces drove them back but not for long. Reconstituted as LURD (Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy), core rebel fighters are former ULIMO-K combatants. LURD moved into Lofa County in July 2000. During fighting between rebel and government troops in 2000 and 2001, 215,000 Liberians sought refuge in neighbouring countries and 80,000 were internally displaced. Although LURD forces were pushed back to the north in October 2002, they soon were on the offensive and fighting government troops near Monrovia in April 2003. At this time a "new" rebel group, MODEL (Movement for Democracy in Liberia), was active in the south. As Roosevelt Johnson is associated with MODEL, this rebel group may be another name for the former ULIMO-J. Repeated attempts for a cease-fire were made by the Roman Catholic Church and the Inter-Religious Council of Liberia (IRC) without success. For their efforts, the government punished peacemakers.

By August 2003 LURD gained control of most of Monrovia and MODEL the port city of Buchanan. A ceasefire mediated by the UN saw the resignation and extradition of Taylor to Nigeria. Vice-President Moses Gblah filled in as president until 14 October 2003, when he was succeeded by Gyude Bryant, a Christian businessman acceptable to the warring factions (and from a neutral ethnic group). Elections are scheduled in 2004.

Cost

Conflict, though, is not over. The cease-fire in Monrovia and Buchanan hasn't been honoured in many areas of the country as LURD and MODEL continue to skirmish with former government forces. Although the WFP (World Food Programme) expects to be fully operational in the interior by November 2003, most observers believe that any semblance of permanent peace requires large numbers of UN and/or other neutral forces. When the former government troops are defeated and demobilised, chances are good that the currently allied rebel forces may turn on themselves in efforts to grab the spoils of war.

Nor can a comeback by Taylor be ruled out. If nothing else, he is tenacious and ruthless. Since his exile, he has repeatedly been charged with interfering in the political affairs of Liberia. Taylor can count on faithful supporters in Liberia and possible help from outside the country. Weapons are abundant in Liberia, despite the UN Security Council imposed embargo. Although Taylor is anathema to Sierra Leone because of his support for RUF (Revolutionary United Front) and person non grata in southern Cote d'Ivoire, Taylor does have supporters in the northern and

western parts of that country and friends in Libya. One needs also to keep in mind the precariousness of stability in much of West Africa. Just emerging from civil war, Sierra Leone is fragile. So, too, is Cote d'Ivoire, a nation that is effectively partitioned between north, west and south. Peace is tenuous in Guinea-Bissau where a military coup removed President Kumba Yala on 14 September 2003. Guineans will go to the polls in December 2003 with the ailing President Lansana Conte running for re-election. Political instability is likely if Conte has to step down due to poor health.

Lives and displacement

It is difficult to imagine a country more devastated by conflict than Liberia. War-related deaths from 1989 through September 2003 numbered over 250,000 people. During the 1990-1996-conflict phase alone, 150,000 or more people were killed and 1-1.5 million uprooted. About 400,000 refugees returned to Liberia between 1997 and early 2002 in the belief that better conditions would prevail.⁴² They were mistaken. In 2002, 80,000 more people escaped, adding to the 200,000 Liberians already outside the country. In December 2002 the main nations of refuge were Guinea (110,000 refugees), Liberia (60,000), Cote d'Ivoire (50,000) and Ghana (35,000). In addition, *The World Refugee Survey* reports that 100,000-150,000 people were displaced within Liberia.⁴³ Other sources placed the IDP figures closer to 250,000-350,000 with 130,000 in camps. If so, then well over ½ million Liberians were uprooted in 2002.

That figure surely has increased from January through August 2003, despite the return of many Sierra Leoneans. The Liberian refugee population in Guinea is probably in excess of 120,000. The IDP population is most to be pitied. Already uprooted, thousands moved to the capital, swelling the IDPs in and around Monrovia to 250,000-300,000. Perhaps another 200,000 were displaced due to conflict elsewhere in the country. By September 2003 there likely were over 500,000 displaced people within the country, bringing the total number of uprooted Liberians to 3/4ths of a million and perhaps more. Thousands of these people were on the move again in mid-September, leaving Monrovia to return to their homes or IDP camps in central Liberia. In November 2003 the WFP estimated that 249,000 people impoverished by the war were living on the periphery of Monrovia.

Internally displaced and refugee populations, particularly, were subjected to brutality by security forces and rebel militias. Both killed, tortured and raped at will. Government troops and paramilitary units were the most vicious, probably because of Taylor's and his cohorts' deeply felt antipathy to ethnic Krahn and Mandingos. In turn, LURD (ULIMO-K) expressed a distinct aversion towards the Kissi. Both rebel and government combatants have actively recruited child soldiers, often forcibly.

Disease

There is little doubt that the nation's 8.2% HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate will increase due to the recent conflict. Outbreaks of cholera occurred in IDP camps near Monrovia and Buchanan and in mid country during August and September 2003. Given widespread insecurity, the healthcare system in much of the country has completely broken down. Liberia's child mortality rate, already the world's fourth highest, will likely increase before the year is over.

Diseases, such as malaria and diarrhoea, take their toll on bodies already weakened by hunger. Aid agencies reported that in mid-September 2003 they did not have access to 80% of Liberians. The WFP estimates that feeding 500,000 IDPs requires 9,000 tonnes of food aid per month. To do so will require a major miracle given that most of the equipment in the ports of Monrovia

⁴² About 20,000 refugees spontaneously repatriated from Cote d'Ivoire in 2002 due to conflict in that country.

⁴³ World Refugee Survey, 2003, loc. cit., p. 7

and Buchanan is either in disrepair or was looted. Because so many farmers weren't able to harvest crops this year, food will be short and aid required through summer 2004.

Lawlessness and infrastructure collapse

Widespread looting has taken place since spring 2003 by both rebels and government forces. The battle for Monrovia in July and August aggravated the massive amount of pillaging that was already occurring. Most observers agree that what's most needed now is security, not only to reduce looting, but to halt the ongoing human rights abuses and make it possible to bring in food and medical aid. Better security may make it possible to restore basic services. The UN Security Council approved 15,000 peacekeeping, UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia), should start deploying by mid-October and will include ECOMIL troops already in Liberia.

Restoration of largely non-functioning public services outside of urban areas, even under more secure conditions, will be difficult. Twin goals of UNICEF are to enrol 750,000 in primary schools as soon as possible and to demobilise about 15,000 child soldiers. These won't be easy to do, as 75% of the country's physical infrastructure was destroyed greatly compounding the problem. In addition, Liberia has such a long history of rampant, endemic raiding of the government treasury that it's an understatement to call it "corruption." Charles Taylor and his National patriotic Party (NPP) were no different than other regimes in their avarice to divide up the spoils. LURD and MODEL are now waiting impatiently to do the same. Conflict serves to exacerbate the already high level of theft by governmental officials.

Debt

Liberia's total external debt at the close of 2001 was US \$2 billion. Public and publicly guaranteed debt was US \$1 billion. The World Bank lists Liberia as a "severely-indebted low-income" country.

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nepal

Background

Political agitation and unrest are synonymous with modern day Nepal. In the mid-1980s, mass demonstrations were held to restore the multiple party system and limit the powers of the monarchy. In 1990 after the death of more than 50 protesters, King Birenda bowed to the opposition and agreed to a new constitution that includes a guarantee of fundamental human rights and an independent judiciary. During elections in 1991, the centre-left Nepali Congress Party (NCP) won a majority of both the 205 seat House of Representatives and the 60 member National Assembly.

Unfortunately, political stability increased rather than declined over the next decade. The NCP quit the coalition of leftist parties and moved to the right, trying unsuccessfully to govern alone. Street protests and general strikes by a collection extreme left wing groups convinced the NCP to form a coalition government with the United Marxists-Leninists (UML) Party. The new government lasted a year and was dissolved in 1994. In the elections that followed, the UML won a bare plurality. Elections were called the following year, as it became clear that the NCP and a coalition on the right would win a no confidence vote.

Government instability that began in 1991 continued as parties split and new coalitions of weak

governments formed. Figures associated with the NCP or splinter groups seemed to rotate in and out of the prime minister's office, especially Girja Prasad Koirala, Sher Bahadur Deuba, Lokendra Bahadur Chand and Surya Bahadur Thapa (currently head of government for the 4th time). Much of the political churning was due to the "People's Revolutionary War" led by militant communists who broke away from the UML to form the Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist (CPN-M). By 1999 The CPN-M were active in 31 of 75 districts in Nepal with 5,000-6,000 guerrilla combatants.

Instability was compounded in June 2001 when the King Birendra, the queen and six other members of the royal family were allegedly killed by the son and heir. The younger brother of the King, Gyanendra, was crowned. A cease-fire in July lasted until November 2001 when Maoists launch new attacks. King Gyanendra declared a state of emergency in November, calling out the army to assist police and other security forces. Killing on both sides continued, making 2002 the most violent year in recent Nepali history. In May parliament was dissolved; the King refused to permit new elections and appointed former Prime Minister Chand as head of government. In January 2003, rebels and the King agreed to a cease-fire.

The main political parties, however, refused efforts to form a united government coalition, claiming that King Gyanendra actions violated the constitution.⁴⁴ During the Summer 2003, mass protests against the King's unitary rule were held in Kathmandu with the arrest of over 1,000 people. Meanwhile, peace talks with the Maoist failed in August. Both the government's royalist negotiators and the rebels held intractable positions. Since 1996 the CPN-M led by its General-Secretary Pushpa Kamal Dahal "Prachanda" insisted on a new constitution with the option of abolishing the monarchy. Understandably, this was not an "option" designed to please the King.

Although the cease-fire ended, most Nepalis hoped that fighting wouldn't restart. Yet by mid-September rebels launched fresh attacks on security forces and called a three-day strike that closed down the country. The Maoists are indeed popular,⁴⁵ particularly among the rural poor, who make up about 75% of Nepal's population. The idea of a multiple party democracy is also popular, especially in urban areas. Not so well liked are King Gyanendra and his heavy-handed governance. The King, though, does have the loyalty of the army.

Nepal's immediate future looks bleak. Fighting and killing have escalated since mid-September 2003. Most analysts agree that neither the government nor the rebels can win the war. On the King's side are the armed forces and international assistance. India, particularly, doesn't want Nepal's rebels supporting insurgents in the State of Bihar. The U.S. has given military aid to Nepal in the past, and more arms have begun to flow recently, especially in the form of air weaponry. China has formed close relations with Nepal and is very unlikely to support the Maoists. The main strengths of the rebels are that they are popular and very committed.

Cost

Deaths and displacement

- Since 1996, more than 10,000 people were killed in the conflict. Most of those deaths have

⁴⁴ The monarch is to act on advice of the Council of Ministers and Council of State. Opposition parties led by the NCP insist that by dismissing parliament, not permitting new elections and ruling with the advise of a small number of ministers, the King has usurped power and his rule is unconstitutional.

⁴⁵ At first blush the CNP-M appears out of sync with the 21st Century. The Party is inspired by Mao Zedong and copies Peru's Shining Path in its tactics. The Maoists are a mix of mostly urban elite leaders and a cadre of the rural poor. Observers believe there are 2,000-4,000 hard-core militants and a militia of 12,000-14,000, but some estimates number the combined militia and cadres at close to 100,000. Maoist rebels effectively control 40% of Nepal and are active in most districts.

been in the last 3 years. Between the end of the ceasefire in August 2003 and the end of November 2003, about 1,200 Nepalis were killed in the conflict.

- The number of internally displaced people (IDPs) at the end of 2002 numbered in the range of 100,000-150,000.
- The number of refugees is unknown, but there are “probably tens of thousands in India.”⁴⁶

Livelihoods

- Already one of the world’s poorest countries, Nepal’s economy is being battered by the conflict. Tourism is the country’s 3rd largest money earner. Unhappily, only about 200,000 tourists visited the country last year, down from 500,000 in 2000. Tourism sector alone lost RS. 6 billion (US \$82.2 million) in revenue in 2001-2002. The government hoped that by cutting visa fees tourism would pick up in 2003. It had earlier in the year, but fresh fighting will doom the rest of the season.
- Nation-wide strikes are expensive. The 3-day strike in September 2003 may have cost Nepal US \$548 million.
- The government increased its defence budget by 70% in 2000/2001, diverting US \$ 52 million from rural development to fight the rebels. Security expenditures increased by 300% since 1997/1998, totalling US \$206.7 million in 2002/2003.
- DFID (UK Department for International Development) estimated that US \$ 246.6 million worth of physical infrastructures was destroyed.

Health and education

- Poverty in Nepal is easily grasped by viewing national data, some of which may be attributed to over a decade of political instability and conflict.
- Nepal’s Human Development Index (HDI) is .499, ranking the country close to the bottom (143 of 175).
- The nation’s child mortality rate of 91 is relatively high.
- 47% of children less than 5 are underweight. In remote parts of the Western and Far Western regions -- Maoist’s strongholds -- 70% of children are underweight.
- Over 82% of the population earn less than US \$2/day; about 38% live on less than US \$1/day (1993 adjusted prices).
- The overall adult literacy rate was 42% in 2000, 24% for women and 65% for men. Only 44% of children enter grade 5.
- “Thousands of classrooms have been destroyed and the cost of rehabilitation is beyond the capacity of country’s economy.”⁴⁷

Other costs

- Both the rebels and government plant landmines, although the country is a signatory of the

⁴⁶ World Refugee Survey, 2003, loc. cit., p. 148

⁴⁷ Bishnu Sapkota, ed., “The Cost of War in Nepal: A Research Study (draft),” National Peace Campaign, Kathmandu, November 2003, p. 21

Ottawa Convention. About 720 people were killed or injured mines in 2002.

- The government is bedevilled by widespread corruption, especially at the higher levels.

Debt

Nepal's total external debt at the end of 2001 was US \$2.7 billion. Public and publicly guaranteed debt was US \$2.6 billion. The World Bank considers Nepal to be a "Less-indebted low-income" nation.

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rwanda

Background

In April 2004 Rwanda and the world remembered the tenth anniversary of the worst massacre in recent African history. The genocide perpetuated that year was not a unique experience in Rwanda, unfortunately. Thousands of Tutsis died in 1959 and 150,000-200,000 fled the country as Hutus overthrew the Tutsi-dominated feudal monarchy that eventually led to Rwandan independence in July 1962. A year later about 20,000 Tutsis were killed in tribal conflicts; thousands more became refugees. Ethnic tensions in Burundi accentuated the tribal stress in Rwanda.⁴⁸ Over 50,000 Hutus crossed from Burundi in 1988, and between 100,000 and 150,000 died in the bloodbath in that nation in 1993.

Yet nothing approached the 100 days of massive killing that erupted in April 1994. That genocide of Tutsis and moderate Hutus was triggered by shooting down the plane carrying Rwanda President Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu who held military and political power since July 1973. For much of his presidency, Habyarimana faced rebel Tutsi forces based in Uganda. By 1990 the largely Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) made deep incursions into Rwanda, nearly capturing the capital, Kigali. Several ceasefires between the government and RPF were made and broken. While a peace accord forming a transitional government was signed in August 1993, Habyarimana vacillated and failed to implement the necessary transitional institutions. On the other side, the RPF continued to expand its operations in the northwest.

Not surprising, militant Hutus blamed Habyarimana's death on the RPF, and through the RPF, all Tutsis. Led by the Presidential Guard, other elements of the largely Hutu army and the extremist Hutu Interahamwe militias, between 500,000 and 1 million people, mostly Tutsi civilians, were brutally murdered. Guilt for this gross atrocity against humankind must be shared by the world that watched, especially the United Nations Security Council and the top UN leadership. The UN failed to act by not heeding the warning of UNAMIR's (UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda) General Romeo Dallaire on the government's illegal stockpiling of arms. Nor did the UN or any of the major powers try to stop the genocide. The RPF did, without outside assistance.

Conflict did not stop with the defeat of the former Rwandan army and associated militias. The north-western part of the country remained a battlefield until 1998. Over 3,000 mostly Hutu

⁴⁸ Before 1994, the ethnic make-up of Rwanda was 85% Hutu, 14% Tutsi and 1% Batwa (Twa or Pigmy). These percentages do not reflect the large inter-marriages, especially between Hutu and Tutsi.

civilians were killed in clashes in 1997. In June 1998 about 6,000 internally displaced Tutsis were killed by rebel Hutu fighters based in the former Zaire. Eventually, RPF excursions into Zaire resulted both in freeing Rwanda's northwest from attack and releasing the camps from Hutu militant control. Perhaps 15,000-20,000 former Interahamwe and Rwandan army combatants remain in the DRC today. Many others, including a main rebel leader, Paul Rwarakabije, have returned.

The RPF stayed in Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from 1996 to 2002. The RPF helped Laurent Kabila overthrow Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko. Asked by then DRC President Kabila to leave in 1998, Rwandan and Ugandan forces supported rebels that ultimately controlled most of the eastern DRC. In October 2002 Rwandan forces left the DRC, but not before splitting with its Ugandan ally in 1999 resulting in skirmishes in 2000 and 2001. Fortunately, more amicable relations between the former allies have prevailed since 2003.

Costs

Massive death and displacement

- The most commonly quoted figure is that 800,000 people were slaughtered in the 1994 genocide. Perhaps another 250,000 Rwandans were killed between 1959 and 1998 in largely ethnically related conflicts. This figure doesn't include the thousands of Hutu refugees that died in refugee camps in the DRC due to cholera and other diseases.
- Large number of Rwandan refugees could be found in neighbouring countries since 1959. Following the RPF victories in 1994, about 1.3 million Hutu refugees fled to the DRC. Since then, most have returned. In 1994 there were about 535,000 Hutu refugees in Tanzania. By January 2003 all had returned. Since 1994, about 2.5 million refugees – nearly 1/3rd of the country's population – have tried to reintegrate.
- Today there are between 50,000 and 80,000 Rwandan refugees (estimates vary). Including about 20,000 in Uganda, 7,000 in Malawi, 5,000 each in the Republic of Congo and Zambia, 3,000 in Zimbabwe and 2,000 in Europe. Undoubtedly, many will seek to remain in their countries of refuge.

Women and children suffer disproportionately

- "Tens of thousands" of women were raped during the 1994 genocide by Interahamwe militia and by former army combatants. One purpose of the rapes was to harm and humiliate. Another gruesome purpose was to infect Tutsi women with HIV/AIDS. For example, samples taken a couple of years ago in three of Rwanda's 12 provinces indicate that 66% of the genocide rape widows are HIV positive.
- War and AIDS orphans in Rwanda number over 1 million.
- Partly as a result, Kigali houses "several thousand" street children. Hundreds were recently rounded up and interred in detention camps.

Health

Conflict had an adverse affect on health, as had pre- and post-war poverty.

- Malaria is the leading killer, and is especially lethal among children less than 5. About 1 million Rwandans suffer from malaria annually.
- HIV/AIDS got a strong boost from conflict and the years of decimated medical facilities. The HIV prevalence rate in 2003 is 13% or over infected 580,000 people.

- Life expectancy is a scant 40 years. The Human Development Index (HDI) is .422, ranking the country 158 where 175 is the lowest (worst).
- Only 41% of the population has access to safe water and a scant 8% to adequate sanitation.
- The child mortality rate of 183 gives Rwanda the 15th highest rate in the world. About 24% of children under 15 are moderately-severely underweight (undernourished) and 43% are moderately-severely stunted (mal and/or undernourished).

Rwanda is facing a high socio-economic demobilisation cost. The government wants to decommission 45,000 soldiers; 10,000 have been demobilised since 2002, including 4,000 disabled veterans.

Economic costs

- Rwanda's economy declined in the early 1990s and plummeted –50.2% in 1994.
- Since the conflict ceased, economic growth has been 5-6% yearly and 9.9% in 2002. The country continues to suffer from the drop in coffee prices, a critically important crop in a country where 90% of the labour force is primarily engaged in subsistence agriculture.
- Rwanda is a very poor state and so, too, are 60% of its population. The country is also the most densely people in Africa with among the fewest natural resources.

Debt

Total debt was US \$1.3 billion and public and publicly guaranteed debt US \$ 1.2 billion in 2001.

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sierra leone

Background

As witnessed by its many coups d'état, Sierra Leone has been politically unstable since its independence in 1961. The inherent instability accelerated into a civil war in 1991; a war that continued into 2001. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebel forces were led by former army corporal Foday Sankoh. At times RUF controlled much of the country, including the main diamond producing area, and three times RUF penetrated into sections of Freetown. After the failure of the second peace agreement in 1999, and less than sterling performances by ECOMOG⁴⁹ and UN forces, the capture of Sankoh in 2000 by British and UN troops led to the disarmament of rebels in 2001. In January 2002 the civil war was officially declared over. While in custody, Sankoh died in July 2003 after an extended period of illness. Former rebel leader Sam Brockarie was killed in May 2003, and it is likely Johnny Paul Koroma died in June 2003. Both men were in Liberia, and both are reported to have been executed by Liberian troops following orders of President Charles Taylor.

On the government side, the war was largely pursued by corrupt, military administrations. Major-General Joseph Saidu Momoh who came to power in 1985 was ousted in a coup led by Captain Valentine Strasser in 1992. Strasser, in turn, was removed by a coup led by Brigadier Julius Bio in 1996. That same year Sierra Leone held its first multiple party election; Ahmad

⁴⁹ ECOWAS (Economic Committee of West African States) Monitoring Group

Tejan Kabbah became the first freely elected president of the country. The following year, Kabbah was removed from office by a Major General Johnny Paul Koroma and a coalition composed of army officers and members of RUF. Sierra Leone was suspended from the Commonwealth, and in 1998, the UN Security Council imposes arms and oil sanctions. ECOMOG intervention permitted Kabbah to return in 1998. In May 2002, he was overwhelmingly re-elected president.

Despite the popular support for Kabbah and his Sierra Leone People's Party, the country is politically fragile. The need for UN peacekeepers (UNMASIL) remains. Nor must one forget that the chronic instability in West Africa will affect Sierra Leone. Cote d'Ivoire is effectively partitioned between north, west and south. Peace is tenuous in Guinea-Bissau where a military coup removed President Kumba Yala in September 2003. Guineans will go to the polls in December 2003 with the ailing President Lansana Conte running for re-election. Political instability is likely if Conte has to step down due to poor health. Then, too, after over a decade of war, Sierra Leone is economically devastated, although the nation is showing healthy signs of recovery. Known especially as a diamond producer, Sierra Leone also has large mineral and timber reserves. Although an oil importer, the government hopes that explorations off shore will find commercial deposits of petroleum.

Cost

Sierra Leone's economy has been ravaged by war. The few manufacturing firms in operation before the war, such as palm oil processing, are closed. Nor has agriculture, an employer of about 2/3rds of the population, recovered. The World Food Programme (WFP) helped feed about 500,000 Sierra Leoneans returnees in 2002. That number has substantially dropped in 2003 (about 80,000 in August), but the WFP provides lunches for 230,000 primary school age children. Food as well as agricultural support (tools, seed, fertiliser) will be required by returnees.

Displacement

Estimates vary but it's likely that during the course of the war about 2 million people or over 1/3rd of the population were uprooted. About 330,000 became refugees, but the majority were internally displaced.

- By August 2003, about 245,000 refugees returned, including most of the 40,000 refugees still remaining in Liberia in 2002. About half of the 70,000 refugees in Guinea have also returned.
- In 2001, IDPs in Sierra Leone numbered about 600,000. By the end of 2002, over half (353,000) had returned to their home areas.

Deaths, injuries, rapes and child soldiers

- Estimates of deaths due to war are in the 100,000-200,000 range. The latter figure is likely to be close to the mark.
- Thousands of men, women and children lost limbs due to amputations mostly by RUF combatants, but evidence suggests that government soldiers and allied militias also engaged in this deplorable offence. Amputees may well number over 4,000. Assuming $\frac{3}{4}$ of the people who were so brutally injured died, then the total number of people who were butchered exceeded 16,000.
- Rape during the war was commonly practiced by RUF, but government troops and militias were also culpable. Unknown numbers, but probably in the thousands, of women were raped; hundreds were forced into sexual slavery as "wives" to rebel soldiers. Psychological

trauma remains. For many, so too are sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), including HIV/AIDS.

- Child soldiers were used by both sides of the conflict, although RUF was the main offender. At the close of the war, RUF decommissioned almost 7,000 children.
- The Truth and Reconciliation Commission's report is expected. Yet serious under funding by the international community may greatly limit its recommendations and effectiveness.

Health, education and infrastructure

- 80% of schools and clinics were heavily damaged during the war. Although Sierra Leone is largely a Muslim country, many of the schools and clinics were built and run by Christian groups.
- 300,000 homes were destroyed.
- Most roads and bridges are in a state of disrepair.
- War may be partially blamed for an illiteracy rate of 69%. Only 39% of boys and 34% of girls are attending primary schools.
- The war must also share the blame for Sierra Leone having one of the world's lowest life expectancies and highest child mortality, maternal mortality and child stunting and wasting rates.
- It comes as no surprise that Sierra Leone is at the bottom of the Human Development Index.
- Average annual per capita GDP fell 4.5% between 1990 and 2000. Foreign companies avoided investing in Sierra Leone due to the civil war, adding to unemployment and the economic disintegration of the economy.
- The country is experiencing a significant "brain drain" as skilled people migrate to other nations.
- War and continued unsettled conditions exacerbate the spread of communicable diseases, including the yellow fever outbreak during the summer of 2003. Malaria persists as the leading killer of children. While not well documented, war conditions increased the spread of HIV/AIDS. Sierra Leone's reported 7% adult prevalence rate is probably a low estimate. Given the lack of HIV prevention and care programmes in a shattered socio-economic environment, the HIV rate may rapidly increase.
- Mass movement to urban centres resulted in a total collapse of agricultural-based industries. Deterioration and destruction of infrastructure creates a situation where producers have become subsistence farmers.
- These migrations of IDPs have caused a great deal of environmental damage, especially to forests and streams in the peri-urban areas as people search for wood and food while polluting water sources.

Debt

Sierra Leone's total external debt was US \$1.2 billion at the close of 2001. Public and publicly guaranteed debt was US \$1 billion. The World Bank lists Sierra Leone as a "severely-indebted low-income" country.

somalia

Background

Most of Somalia has been without a stable government for over a decade. Unlike recent conflicts in most other African nations, ethnic differences along tribal lines cannot be blamed. Except for parts of the south, the people are Somali and speak Somali. Rather than ethnic divides, conflict is among clans and sub-clans, with roots of animosity and distrust that long predates current troubles.

Today's hostilities are a continuation of strife that began in the 1980s and culminated with anti-government riots in Mogadishu in July 1989. The tumult split the Merehan clan, led by President and dictator Mohamed Siyad Bare, from the larger Ogadeni clan. Clan coalitions, such as the Somali Patriotic Front, United Democratic Congress and Somali National Movement (SNM), formed to battle Bare's forces. Bare fled the capital in January 1991, and inter-clan fractiousness has dominated the Somali scene ever since.

While clans fought, 1.5-2 million civilians starved. The UN Security Council persuaded the main antagonists, notably Ali Mahdi and Mohamed Farah Aideed, to allow food aid into the country through UNOSOM (UN Operations in Somalia) in April 1992. Due to insecurity, a U.S.-led UN military mission, UNITAF (UN Unified Task Force), arrived in June 1993. While the UN and NGOs (non-governmental organisations) fed people, UNITAF alienated warlords, especially Aideed. Confrontation resulted in the deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers, about twice as many Pakistani peacekeepers, over 300 Somali combatants and an equal number of Somali civilians. All UN activities ceased in 1995.

Fighting was particularly severe in 1995 and 1996 in the cities of Mogadishu and Kismayo. Among scores of others, Aideed was killed, to be succeeded by his son, Hussein, who promptly crowned himself "President" of Somalia. Conflict continued. Hussein Aideed's Somali National Alliance (SNA) clashed with old enemies Ali Mahdi and Ali "Ato" and new foes, such as the Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA). The factional wars became internationalised with Eritrean support for the SNA and Ethiopia's for the RRA.

Despite earlier failed attempts at peacemaking, the International Authority on Development (IGAD) brought together leaders of 26 Somali factions in Cairo during November 1997. They agreed to a cease-fire and to form a new government. The truce has been repeatedly broken, although conflict has generally devolved into sporadic skirmishes periodically intermixed with fierce fighting, particularly in Baidoa, Kismayo and Mogadishu.

The Cairo meetings led to most warlords gathering in Djibouti in May 2000 to create a three-year Transitional National Government (TNG) with Abdiqassim Salad Hassan as President and a 245 member Transitional National Assembly (TNA).⁵⁰ While supported by most Somali factions and the international community, the TNG was not recognised by Somaliland that declared its

⁵⁰ Since October 2002 there is an ongoing IGAD led Somalia Peace conference (co-ordinated by the three front line states of Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti) but there has not been a major breakthrough yet to form the national government. IGAD head of states meeting in Uganda reviewed the progress of the Somali peace talks and devised a plan for stronger participation of all the six member countries to put pressure on all parties to join the peace talks and use the opportunity to recreate a federal Somali state.

independence from Somalia in 1991; Puntland that proclaimed its autonomy in 1998; and several warlords, especially Hussein Aideed.

Nevertheless, with IGAD promptings the TNG has continued to meet with building peace and writing a new Somali constitution high on the agenda. The Transitional Federal Charter was adopted by the TNA in September 2003, but rejected by the TNG President Hassan since the proposed constitution establishes a federal rather than a unitary government. A number of factions including leaders of the RRA, Juba Valley Alliance and SNA (Hussein) also refused to sign, but Puntland President Jama Ali Jama did. Maintaining that it's an independent country, Somaliland continues to ignore the TNG.

Somalia isn't a nation state, at least in the usual understanding of the term. Somaliland in the northwest declared its independence in 1991. The former British territory has been acting as a separate, independent entity for over a decade. Somaliland twice held generally free and fair elections. Although still un-recognised by any government except Ethiopia, 96% of voters in Somaliland chose independence over a union with Somalia. The results weren't surprising, given the destruction of Hargeysa under government forces in the late 1980s and that most of Somaliland is peopled by members of one clan.

Adjacent Puntland in the northeast is also primarily a single clan entity that declared itself an autonomous region in 1998. The territory has been generally calm except for its own sub-clan, mini civil war in 2001-2002 to decide Puntland's president. During an election in Puntland in May 2002 Ali Jama emerged as president, but the most powerful figure remains Col. Abdullah Yussuf Ahmed.

In the south, General "Morgan" tried to carve out the autonomous region of Jubaland. He failed, but in March 2002 the RRA and other factions declared Southwest Somalia as an autonomous region with Baidoa as the capital and followed by the Juba valley Alliance (JVA) who in opposition to the RRA's move establishing the Juba land with the capital in Kismayo.

Cost

Death and displacement

- Deaths due to conflict since 1991 have been enormously high, especially in the 1991-1992 famine period. Probably 500,000 people starved to death or died of hunger related causes, chiefly because fighting among rival factions prevented food aid from reaching hungry people.
- Since 1992 the war-induced death rate dropped, but hundreds of people are killed annually in skirmishes, especially in the Bakool, Gedo and Bay (Baidoa) regions along with Mogadishu and Kismayo. In November 2003 clan battles erupted in the central area (near Dusa-Mareb) displacing 2,000 families.
- In 1991-1992, conflict exacerbated by famine displaced about 2 million people within Somalia while another 800,000 sought refuge in neighbouring lands.
- Reports vary as to the current number of IDPs (internally displaced people). In September 2003 there were 370,000 people living in "appalling conditions" in Somalia, including Puntland and Somaliland. Another report gives the total IDP population in Somaliland alone at 600,000 (camps and spontaneously settled).
- Similarly, the number Somali refugees can only be approximated. At the close of 2002 there were 300,000 according to the *World Refugee Survey*. Kenya (140,000) and Yemen (79,000) hosting the most. Somaliland anticipates that 20,000-25,000 of 32,000 refugees in Ethiopia will repatriate in 2003.

Health and education

- Only 10-20% of children attend school, partly because fees are charged and also because in many areas there are no schools. The adult literacy rate of about 25% may be expected to fall.
- Except in Somaliland, only 1% of children have access to adequate medical facilities. Only 2 hospitals and 25 clinics survived the years of conflict. Most doctors fled to other countries.
- As expected, there is little country data for Somalia, and what there is, isn't positive. Child mortality is estimated at 225, the world's 7th highest. Primary school enrolment is a dismal 12%. About 1/3rd of children are moderately or severely underweight.

Other costs

- In relatively stable Somaliland, about 60% of the territory's budget is allocated for the military and police. One would assume that the Transitional National Government (TNG) in Somalia devotes an even higher percent of resources for security. However, the TNG tax base must be small as most of Mogadishu and most of the country is outside of its effective control.
- Due to the chaotic nature of Somalia south of Puntland, the U.S. believed the country contained elements associated or in sympathy with al-Qaida, such as al-Ittihad al-Islami. A UN report released in April 2003 said that such was not the case, although Somalia has served international terrorists as a transit country between the Middle East and East Africa.

Debt

Somalia's total external debt at the end of 2001 was US \$ 2.5 billion. Public and publicly guaranteed debt was US \$1.8 billion. The World Bank considers Somalia to be a "severely-indebted low-income" nation.

Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs

sri lanka

Background

Few conflicts have been so vicious as Sri Lanka's. Precisely when the civil war actually started is difficult to date. Most observers pick July 1983 when 600– 1,000 people, mostly ethnic Tamils, were brutally massacred in Colombo and other parts of the country. Troubles, though, had been mounting for years. Tensions leading to conflict were common since independence, not only between Tamil and Sinhalese but also among radical and moderate segments of both ethnic groups. Yet in May 1983 TULF (Tamil United Liberation Front) walked out of parliament, and conflict was ratcheted up across the country.

Ceasefires were made and broken. While most battle and guerrilla attacks took place in the North and East, few places were immune from violence. On a number of occasions Colombo was the target of LTTE (Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam), so, too, were government and factional leaders. Examples include the assassination of President Ranasinghe Premadasa in May 1993 and the attempt on President Chandrika Kumaratunga's life in December 1999.

LTTE attacks on civilians often coincided with the government military excursions into LTTE-

held areas, usually with mixed results. For example, the stalled push in 1987 by government forces into the Jaffna Peninsula set the stage for peacemaking efforts by India. Indian troop strength grew from 7,000 to 50,000 after the LTTE quit talking and began fighting peacekeepers. The latter withdrew in March 1990.⁵¹ A renewed effort by the government to retake the North in 1995 was more successful, and Jaffna City eventually was re-captured by the armed forces. Yet fighting in the North dragged on through 1999 with both sides paying a high price. Government forces lost thousands of soldiers in 1997-1998 alone. LTTE probably saw a comparable number of their combatants killed.

While the centre of conflict was between the government and LTTE, other struggles were taking place. For years the Sinhalese-dominated Janatha Vimukhi Peranuna (JVP) party on the extreme left served as both a political and militant irritant. Raids by security forces killed most of JVP's leaders and scores of rank and file members in 1989-1990, temporarily dismantled the party. However, the disruptive JVP has made something of a comeback. LTTE engaged in numerous internecine conflicts with other, usually more moderate, Tamil groups since the early 1980s. Over the years, LTTE effectively nullified most other Tamil voices by battle or assassination. The killing continues. About 40 non-LTTE political opponents were murdered since the nation-wide truce in February 2002. Apparently LTTE hardliners, such as paramount leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, don't consider that the ceasefire is applicable to intra-Tamil affairs.

Nor does LTTE have respect for its Muslim neighbours. LTTE has been trying to ethnically cleanse the North and East for years. In 1990, it expelled 72,000 Muslims from the North, and LTTE continues to harass Muslims in the East. One negative but expected result is the formation of Muslim combatants, although the strength of this force is unknown.

Better news is that the overall ceasefire initiated in December 2001 and formalised in February 2002 is generally holding. There have been infractions, a great worry to the opposition People's Alliance Party led by President Kumaratunga. Her deep concern is that LTTE is rearming, something that the rebels did during past ceasefires. The opposition's other concern is that Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasighe might give the LTTE too much autonomy over too large an area. While Tamils are the ethnic majority in the North, they are a minority people in the East, but it is an area claimed by the LTTE.⁵² Many Lankans fear that despite the recent rhetoric, LTTE's real goal is to govern an independent country in the North and East.

A peace accord hasn't been achieved, despite the year and half ceasefire negotiated through the good offices of the Norwegian government and overseen by the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM). The government and LTTE met six times, but the LTTE decided not to attend the donor pledging session in Japan nor the seventh scheduled meeting in April 2003.⁵³ LTTE has also rejected three power-sharing proposals by the government, although subsequently the rebels made a counter offer on 31 October 2003.⁵⁴ Aiding in the peace process is the Inter-Religious Alliance for National Unity (IRANU) that includes representatives from the Buddhist, Christian, Hindu and Muslim faith communities.

⁵¹ The LTTE was probably responsible for the assassination of India's President Rajiv Gandhi in 1991.

⁵² The population of areas actually controlled by the LTTE is 400,000.

⁵³ Governments pledged US \$ 4.5 billion in grants and loans to assist in national reconstruction once a peace accord is reached. In addition, both the World Bank and UNDP promised funds. Pledges have a short life cycle. The government is concerned that unless a peace treaty is soon implemented, many of those pledges may disappear.

⁵⁴ Kumaratunga's declaration of a state of emergency and dismissal of parliament for two weeks in November 2003 was an expression of her displeasure with the peace process. By the end of November, the country was locked in a political deadlock around the peace negotiations with the LTTE.

Cost

Death and displacement

The near two-decade conflict between Tamil rebels, principally the LTTE, and government troops killed 60,000-65,000 civilians. Add to these numbers 21,000 soldiers who died fighting the LTTE and unknown but probably comparable numbers of rebel combatants. Further, an estimated 11,000 of 20,000 people who “disappeared” have not been accounted for. In addition, somewhere between 25,000 and 50,000 civilians and security forces were killed in conflicts between the militant JVP and the state. A total of these figures, assuming half the disappeared are dead, reveals the grim picture in that it's likely between 133,000-163,000 people were killed between July 1983 and February 2002. These figures don't tell the whole story, as civilians indirectly killed due to hunger and disease are not included.

- In March 2002, there were 600,000 IDPs (internally displaced people) in Sri Lanka. By the end of 2002 that number declined to 400,000, and people (mostly Tamil) continue to return to their homes.
- At the close of 2002, there were 155,000 Tamil Lankan refugees living outside the country, 143,000 in India.

Landmines

- Between them, government and rebel forces planted 1.5 million landmines. De-mining efforts are being made by the UN and NGOs (non-governmental organisations).

Economic resources

- War is expensive. No reliable figures are available regarding LTTE military expenses. They must have been substantial until 2001 when governments began to crack down on expatriate Tamils sending funds to support LTTE. On the government side, 150,000 men and women were still in the armed forces in 2003. Salaries and other defence expenditures consumed 30% of the national budget in 1998, about double that of health and education combined.
- Conflict cost the country 1-5% reduction in economic growth annually. In 2001 growth was negative (-1.4%), but rebounded nicely during peace to 3.7% in 2002.
- Some of the economic resurgence is due to revitalised tourism, once a major component in Sri Lanka's economy. The number of visitors increased from 180,000 in 2002 to an expected 500,000 in 2003.
- The rupee has also rebounded. Primarily due to war costs, the annual inflation rate tended to be in the 11-14% range. Inflation is now in check and in 2003 the rupee reached a 12-year high exchange rate vis-à-vis major currencies.
- With more money in its coffers, the government intends to spend US \$180 million in extending electricity to more rural areas. Far more resources for infrastructure repair and expansion will be available in both government and LTTE controlled areas once a peace treaty is signed.
- Undoubtedly, the North and parts of the East will require extensive rebuilding efforts, including roads, schools and clinics. While Sri Lanka has excellent health care and public education systems overall, schools and other facilities in rebel-controlled areas have probably deteriorated during years of conflict as most LTTE resources were spent for

military purposes.

Debt

Sri Lanka's total external debt at the close of 2001 was US \$8.5 billion. Public and publicly guaranteed debt was US \$7.5 billion. The World Bank lists Sri Lanka as a "less-indebted middle-income" country.

Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs of Conflict Costs

sudan

Background

Sudan has been mired in civil war for more than forty-five years, with only a ten-year period of relative peace. The combined effect of the last two decades of Government of Sudan (GoS) and militia attacks, Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) fighting, bombing raids and mass evictions, exacerbated during periods of drought, has created a state of chronic insecurity and poverty, particularly among rural communities in the south. The near total lack of infrastructure has left the population extremely vulnerable to disease, starvation and insecurity.

The Sudan conflict is an incredibly complex nexus of competing and complicated political, economic and social interests. The conflict was broadly characterised as a war between the Arab Islamic North and the African Christian and animist South, but it is far more intricate than this broad superficial characterization. Moreover, in recent years, violent conflict within the North itself has surfaced in the Western and Eastern regions, between Arabs and black African tribes. There are many factors that have created and perpetuated this protracted conflict including divisive colonial policies; the sudden post-colonial power transition; economic disparities between North and South; the clash of contesting identities; the diversity of peoples, culture and traditions; the struggle for resources and land; a self-sustaining war economy; and foreign political and military involvement. In addition to the plethora of conflict issues, there are a myriad of conflicting parties and actors operating at different levels: the GoS, the SPLM/A, the militias, the different tribes and even neighbouring communities.

The current government came to power in a military coup in June 1989 by the National Islamic Front (NIF) led by Gen. Omar el Bashir after toppling the democratically elected government of Sadiq el Mahdi. The NIF scuttled the ongoing peace talks and continued to wage war against the South. In 1991, due to internal power and ethnic divisions as well as political outlook, the SPLA split into two groups –SPLM/A-Mainstream led by Garang, a Dinka and the SPLM/A-United led by Dr. Riek Machar, a Nuer, and Dr. Lam Akol, a Shilluk. This division coincided with a wide-ranging and brutal war unleashed between the Nuer and the Dinka. Splits within the southern rebels continued to the extent that today there are an estimated 32 militias operating in Southern Sudan. In 1997, many of the Southern militias and splinter groups signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement, officially indicating their cooperation with the GoS. However in recent years, many of the Southern splinter groups have flipped sides and joined the SPLM/A. The most famous recent merger involved Riek Machar's Sudan Peoples Defense Forces (SPDF) re-joining the SPLM/A.

July 2002 marked a promising new step in the multinational initiative to reach a peace settlement. Negotiations held under Kenyan leadership and the sponsorship of IGAD led to the signing of the Machakos Protocol by the two principle warring parties – GoS and SPLM/A. The Protocol provided for a six-year interim period (and a six month, pre-interim period) with a

view to improving the institutions and arrangements to make the unity of Sudan attractive⁵⁵ to the people of Sudan. The interim period will be followed by a referendum conducted in the South to confirm or reject the unity of Sudan.

Other breakthroughs in this process have included the October 2002 signing of the *Cessation of Hostilities* that greatly improved humanitarian access to many areas of the South and the September 2003 *Security Arrangements Agreement* that resolved many contentious military and security issues. Furthermore, in January 2004 a wealth-sharing agreement was agreed upon by the parties, and a general consensus has also evolved on the future political status of the contested areas of Abyei, Nuba Mountains, and Southern Blue Nile. Remaining issues that will require further discussions in the ongoing discussions in Naivasha, Kenya include power-sharing arrangements and the legal status of the future national capital.

Despite the progress made in Naivasha towards a peace agreement for Sudan, the deteriorating conflict situation in Darfur has cast a shadow on the prospective peace. The ongoing conflict there between the rebel groups, Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equity Movement (JEM), and the GoS-supported Janjaweed (Arab militias) is considered one of the most serious humanitarian crises in Africa presently. Over 800 000 people have been displaced from their homes due to the violence, and 110 000 have fled to neighbouring Chad. Although a 45-day ceasefire was signed on April 9 in Ndjamen, Chad between the major warring parties, the root causes of the violence have yet to be addressed and could therefore lead to the protracted continuation of suffering in Sudan.

Cost

Death and displacement

- Approximately 2 million Sudanese have died and over 4 million have been displaced from homes in the last period of conflict from 1983.
- There are approximately 4.4 million uprooted Sudanese people, including 4 million internally displaced -- the largest displaced population in the world.
- More than 75% of the displaced Sudanese are women and children.
- An estimated 650 000 Sudanese are refugees and asylums seekers in other countries including Uganda (155 400), Kenya (68 200), Ethiopia (84 200), DRC (70 000), Central Africa Republic, Chad and Eritrea
- Sudan has up to 4 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), although several thousand IDPs and limited number of refugees have returned to Southern Sudan in recent months given the positive progress in the peace process.

Orphans

- More than 300 000 children live unaccompanied and unprotected on the streets of Khartoum, many of who come from southern and central Sudan.
- Approximately 80% of these children are believed to be working street children while about 4 600 are girls.
- In 2002, the UN estimated that more than 50,000 children in southern Sudan had lost both of their parents due to civil war while another 170,000 had no information about their biological parents.

⁵⁵ The protocol provided a partial agreement to the issues of religion and state, and Self-determination for the people of southern Sudan. The protocol allows for Islamic Law (Sharia) to continue serving as a basis for legislation for the Muslim north, while the largely Christian and Animists south will be exempt from Sharia-based legislation. *The Sudan Peace, 2002*

Threats to Civilians

- Between 500,000 and 2 million mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) exist in Sudan, planted by both the government and the rebel groups.
- The GoS claims that landmines incidents have accounted for more than 700,000 deaths and an equal number of amputees throughout the last period of conflict.
- Sudan has one of the largest build up of small arms in the world.
- Despite the signing of agreement (October 2002) between GoS and SPLM/A allowing unimpeded humanitarian access to all parts of Sudan, persistent flight bans by GoS and denial of aid workers accessing thousand of civilians in southern Sudan, Darfur, as well as the Nuba and Blue Nile areas has been experienced. Such an act remains in violation of many international conventions it has signed, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Geneva Conventions, which calls for the special protection of civilians and children during armed conflict.
- Denial of food and medical treatment, along with other war tactics, has endangered civilians, especially children's physical and mental well-being. Besides, trained health personnel and medicine are not readily available, especially in southern Sudan, with the exception of international medical teams.
- Although Civilian Protection Unit Team (CPMT) was launched in September 2002, with a mandate to investigate allegations of international military attacks on civilian target by all parties to conflict, monitoring has been slow to commence and general involves no repercussions against the perpetrators.

Morbidity, mortality and health

- The maternal ratio in Sudan is 550 deaths per 100,000 live births.
- Infant Mortality is 86/1000 overall and 68/1000 in the North.
- 11% of children under age five in the northern sector showed wasting with the worst cases being recorded in Western Kordofan, North Darfur and Blue Nile states (UNICEF, 2000).
- Global Malnutrition rates range between 23 – 39.3% in most surveyed areas of Southern Sudan.
- At least one in every 10 children in Sudan dies before the age of five, including many who succumb to disease.
- According to OLS, malnutrition rates of up to 50% have been recorded in the northern sector during specific periods.
- Warring parties deliberately destroy health facilities, loot medical goods and kill and intimidate health workers.
- Approximately 60 000 people, especially children continue to risk infection of trypanosomiasis while another 9,000 – 12,000 are in immediate need of treatment⁵⁶.

⁵⁶ Violence and insecurity prevent inoculations, treatments and health education campaigns that are necessary for controlling common diseases – trachoma, malaria, cholera, measles, onchocerciasis and tuberculosis.

- Sudan is one of the 13 countries in the world where dracunculiasis (guinea worm disease) occurs. 8% of the world's reported cases occur in southern Sudan.
- 350,000 people in Upper Nile are currently infected by the Kala azar epidemic.
- About 450 000 people, including 30 000 children of age 15 and under had HIV/AIDS at the end of 2001.

Economic Costs

- The GNP per capita is US\$ 290. Sudan's income from exports has been on the decline from an average US \$450 m in the 1980s to US \$53m in 1993-94. The country has depended on remittances from nationals abroad, but these remittances fell from US \$500m in 1989 to US \$60m in 1994.
- As of March 2003, approximately 2.5 million people in Sudan are in dire need of food and other emergency supplies, with women and children hardest hit by this wide spread of hunger and malnutrition. Thousand of children suffer from marasmas, the most severe degree of malnutrition.
- Less than 35% of the people of Sudan have access to adequate sanitation.
- In 2000, only 26% of households in southern Sudan had access to safe drinking water during dry season, and about 40% of the population of the nation did not have access to an improved source of drinking water.

Sudan's primary school enrolment rate is 48% in the North with a 3 to 5% gender gap. In the South, the enrolment rate is 22% with a gender gap of 60 to 75%, although in the garrison towns in the South, the school enrolment rate is 57.8%.

Debt

Sudan owes about US \$20 billion foreign creditors. The country is significantly in arrears on the interest payments on this debt. The US \$20 billion debt is about 250% of Sudan's estimated gross domestic product (GDP) of US \$7 billion annually.

annex a: vital statistics on costs of conflict

Conflict	Years of conflict	Estimated Civilian War Casualties	Debt per person	External Debt, US\$ billion	Child Mortality (>5 yrs)	2003 HDI Ranking	2002 Adult HIV/AIDS Prevalence,	Displaced - % of total population	Internally Displaced	Refugees	Est. Population at End of Conflict or 2003
Afghanistan	24	1,000,000	\$83.62	2.4	257	N/A	n/a	5%	800,000	500,000	28,700,000
Angola	36	1,500,000	\$755.91	9.6	260	164	5.5%	18.1%	2,000,000	300,000	12,700,000
Burundi	10	300,000	\$180.33	1.1	190	171	8.3%	18.0%	450,000	650,000	6,100,000
Cambodia	30	1,850,000	\$228.81	2.7	138	130	2.7%	5.9%		700,000	11,800,000
Chechnya	10	118,000		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	29%	225,000	10,000	800,000
DR Congo	5	5,000,000	\$201.41	11.4	205	167	4.9%	6.4%	3,200,000	410,000	56,600,000
Guatemala	36	200,000	\$454.55	5	58	119	0.4%	10.9%	1,000,000	200,000	11,000,000
Haiti 1	14	N/A	\$166.67	1.25	123	150	6.1%	0.5%	6,200	35,000	7,500,000
Lebanon 2	25	170,000	\$3,890.63	12.45	32	83	N/A	25.0%	800,000		3,200,000
Liberia 3	14	250,000	\$606.06	2	235	N/A	8.2%	18.8%	500,000	120,000	3,300,000
Nepal	6	10,000	\$107.14	2.7	91	143	0.5%	0.7%	150,000	20,000	25,200,000
Rwanda	1	800,000	\$139.78	1.3	183	158	8.9%	0.7%	2,500.00	65,000	9,300,000
Sierra Leone	11	200,000	\$214.29	1.2	316	175	7.0%	6.9%	350,000	35,000	5,600,000
Somalia	13	500,000	\$312.50	2.5	225	N/A	1.0%	11.3%	600,000	300,000	8,000,000
Sri Lanka	19	163,000	\$440.41	8.5	19	99	0.1%	2.9%	400,000	155,000	19,300,000
Sudan	35	2,000,000	\$524.93	20	107	138	2.6%	14.4%	5,000,000	500,000	38,100,000
Totals	289	14,061,000		84.1	-	-	-	-	15,483,700	4,000,000	247,200,000
Average	18.1	937,400	\$ 553.80	5.6	165	141	4%	11%	-	-	-

1 Haiti casualty figures are not available

2 Lebanon's IDP figure includes refugees

3 Liberia's AIDS figure is an estimate prior to the conflict

Colour: External debt - yellow = "severely indebted" (World Bank)

Child Mortality - yellow = bottom third

HIV/AIDS - yellow = "high prevalence" (UNAIDS)

HDI Ranking - yellow - "low human development" (UNDP)

Sources:

- Under Five Mortality Rate - Probability of dying before five years of age expressed per 1,000 live births. 2003 UNICEF State of the World's Children (Data is from 2001)
- 2003 Human Development Index - <http://www.undp.org> - yellow indicates "Low human development" by UNDP's measure
- UNAIDS 2002 "Report on the Global HIV-AIDS pandemic - http://www.unaids.org/Unaid/EN/Resources/Publications/Corporate+publications/Report+on+the+global+HIV_AIDS+epidemic+2002+.asp

World Vision is a Christian relief and development partnership which serves more than 85 million people in some 80 countries. World Vision seeks to follow Christ's example by working with the poor and oppressed in the pursuit of justice and human transformation.

Children are often most vulnerable to the effects of poverty. World Vision works with each partner community to ensure that children are able to enjoy improved nutrition, health and education. Where children live in especially difficult circumstances, surviving on the streets, suffering in exploitative labour, or exposed to the abuse and trauma of conflict, World Vision works to restore hope and to bring justice.

World Vision recognises that poverty is not inevitable. Our Mission Statement calls us to challenge those unjust structures, which constrain the poor in a world of false priorities, gross inequities and distorted values. World Vision desires that all people are able to reach their God-given potential, and thus works for a world which no longer tolerates poverty.

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Safea was 14 years old in 1996 when he was de-mobilised after fighting in Sierra Leone's army. The scars on this teenager's face and head are only the visible scars of four years combat experience. He underwent rehabilitation at the Benin Home under a Children Associated with War (CAW) project supported by World Vision in Sierra Leone.

Photo: Winnie Ogana/World Vision 1996.